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PREFACE
This report was presented in testimony on July 23, 1975 at hearings on the proposed
OSHA noise standard by Dr. Nicholas A. Ashford. He was accompanied by Dr. Dale Hattis
and Mr. George Heaton. Dr. Ashford is a senior staff member of the Center for Policy
Alternatives at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and has had formal graduate
training in science, law and economics. Dr. Hattis is an environmental scientist and
Mr. Heaton is a lawyer and regulatory policy analyst. Also participating in this study was
Judith Katz, technical assistant at the Center for Policy Alternatives, and currently com
pleting a law degree. While the authors did not claim to be experts in noise regulation,
they have been considerably involved with the problems of technology and society, with
particular emphasis on the areas of occupational health and safety, environmental regula
tion, and the effects of government intervention in the innovation process.
Mr. George Eads of the Council on Wage and Price Stability has expressed his agency's
dismay at the wide divergence of opinion on fundamental issues in the OSHA proceedings
and has expressed a wish for a narrowing of the differences. However, there appears to be
less important controversy about the data itself than about how to deal with uncertain
data or what standard of proof must be met to justify the setting of the standard. In short,
surrogate arguments have arisen which have obscured basic philosophical differences.
Below, the authors hope to articulate the nature of the different views and their implica
tions for the adoption of an appropriate standard.
Both sources of confusion in the rationale for standard-setting and some of the tech
nical issues in conflict were discussed. It is hoped that this working paper will be of
assistance in the selection of a final workplace noise standard by helping to elucidate both
the nature of the social and economic costs and benefits and alternate bases for decision
making in this troubled area.
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Section 1
INTRODUCTION
THE RATIONALE FOR STANDARD-SETTING
In difficult economic times, it is expected that a society reexamine the question of
whether the longer-range benefits that are likely to accrue from environmental/safety
regulation are justified by potentially high shorter-range costs. This is the simplest way
to state the problem; it can also be the most deceptive. There are really three important
considerations relevant to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA)
standard-setting function:
1 . The important distinctions in the justification of government intervention in
occupational or environmental health matters as compared to economic regu
lation such as that found in antitrust or utility regulation.
2. The limitations of traditional cost-benefit techniques for making social decisions.
3. The mandate of the OSHAct.
Justification for Government Intervention in Occupational or
Environmental Health Matters
The rationale for government intervention in the marketplace is usually expressed in
terms of one of two purposes:
1 . To improve the working of the market for goods and services by encouraging
competition, economic efficiency, and diversity of available goods and services.
2. To ameliorate the adverse consequences of market activities and technology in
general by reducing the attendant social costs.
The underlying reason for pursuing these goals is not to improve the efficiency of the
market for its own sake, but to optimize social welfare. Economic regulation generally
addresses itself to the first purpose by attempting to ensure that the price mechanism
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operates efficiently to properly allocate goods and services between economic sectors and
between producers and consumers, but also to properly allocate resources between genera
tions. Economic regulation, properly carried out, thereby is generally expected to reduce
the price of the goods and services it seeks to regulate.
Occupational or environmental health regulation, on the other hand, attempts to
internalize the social costs attending market activities - especially those associated with
technology - and it does this by making sure that the prices of goods and services reflect
the true costs to the consumer. Thus, it might be expected that prices would increase in
some cases to reflect true costs. Including the costs of minimizing adverse health conse
quences from technology in the price of goods and services represents a shift in the way
the costs are accounted for and not necessarily a true increase in the cost to society.
Thus, it can be seen that the two kinds of regulation - economic and occupational
or environmental health - are expected to operate somewhat differently, because they
address different aspects of market activity. There is, however, one further critical dis
tinction: occupational or environmental health regulation also has a fundamental pur
pose, the protection of certain groups of people — for example, children, workers in an
asbestos plant, or the less educated. This is justified under the principle of equity or
fairness, whereby some economic efficiency is said to be sacrificed for the health or
safety of those special groups.
The fact that economic efficiency is sometimes traded for equity considerations should
not be disturbing unless it is either unnecessary for the result or one forgets that economic
efficiency is a measure of maximizing rather than optimizing social welfare. In fact, it
should be remembered that small business is paid special attention in formulating economic
regulatory strategies - and there is a conscious tradeoff between economic efficiency and
equity considerations in maintaining the viability of the small firm. Regulatory policies
aimed at fairness to the worker are no less justified.
Having reviewed some of the distinctive justifications for occupational or environ
mental/health regulation, the question arises as to the appropriateness of traditional cost-
benefit techniques for making social decisions in this area of regulation.
Appropriateness of Cost-Benefit Analysis for Making Social Decisions
Economic analysis not only helps to describe many issues in occupational or environ
mental health regulation, it also provides tools such as cost-benefit analysis for helping
evaluate the consequences of decisions.
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Some of the major problems in using cost -benefit analysis arise because health and
safety benefits are not easily compared to dollar costs. The market value of human life is
not adequately represented in the traditional measures of lost wages, awards for pain and
suffering, or willingness to trade off risk of harm for lower prices in the marketplace. It is
extremely difficult for one to relate to long-range, low-probability risks of harm or, to put
it another way, it is difficult to value benefits likely to accrue in the future, if at all.
Further, since the costs and benefits of regulation occur in different time frames, one is
faced with the inevitable difficulty of applying an appropriate discount rate to items dif
ficult, if not impossible, to monetarily quantify in the first place. The situation is further
complicated because often too little is known about adverse health effects of occupational
and environmental hazards and decisions, and valuation of these effects must nonetheless
be made.
Often, decision-making has economic efficiency as its only objective. However, the
question of who pays the cost and who reaps the benefit is also important. Minimizing
nonrandom victimization through a concern for individual justice is a legitimate social goal
that may at times conflict with attainment of economic efficiency. Society may prefer
to move away from an economically efficient point to have a fairer distribution of costs
and benefits. Of course, different people view what is fair differently — but this fact makes
the consideration of equity no less important. Whatever the alternative value judgments
are as to what is fair, the costs should be known for those alternatives being considered.
In short, cost-benefit analysis takes no special notice of the fact that the cost and
benefit streams accrue to different elements of society. To what extent then is cost-benefit
useful as a rational basis for action?
Expert consultants, economists or otherwise, have little more to contribute than other
citizens to the evaluation of equity effects of occupational health decisions. Such an evalu
ation should be made collectively by an informed public and should be a reflection of the
societal values. The value put on equity consideration in occupational health matters has
been expressed in the OSHAct and is, in practice, further refined and interpreted by the
administrative law and judicial systems.
What economists can do is specify the equity effects, as well as allocative effects, of
regulatory decisions. Despite its limitations and the methodological problems associated
with its use, one might think that cost-benefit analysis is at least employed in good faith,
solely as a technical aid by decision-makers. In practice, unfortunately, this description is
often not the case. Cost-benefit analysis is often used in an attempt to convince other
parties that a course of action (predetermined on other grounds) is justified. Value judg
ments are often hidden in the assumptions on which the calculation is based, and
balancing costs and benefits without consideration of equity is value-laden itself - it is a
decision to ignore equity.
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The Mandate of the OSHAct
Because lives and dollars are incommensurables, there is no theoretically correct way
to balance costs and benefits. The decision is a political decision and Congress has given
guidance on what the proper OSHA posture should be in section 6(b)(5) of the OSHAct.
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or
harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available
evidence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by
such standard for the period of his working life.
Whether or not OSHA complies with its mandate depends on the interpretation of
what "to the extent feasible" implies in terms of economic and technological burdens and
how many workers are left unprotected. The term material impairment can be defined to
give a larger or smaller number of these unprotected. Finally, the minimum quality of the
evidence that OSHA uses to make its decisions will also determine the kind of standard it
will establish. "To the extent feasible" by ordinary construction would appear to mean
that the workplace is to be made safe as long as the industry is not incapable of complying.
A balancing of costs and benefits is to be done heavily in favor of worker health, not
necessarily with the result that workplace disease is at an economically efficient level.
Daniel Boyd, Director of the OSHA Office of Standard Development, has stated in his
testimony that: "The levels which OSHA has proposed are designed to protect a majority
of the occupationally-exposed population from noise-induced hearing impairment," and
further that "The basic issue has been how to define impairment of hearing as distinguished
from loss of hearing." This, in fact, is not the basic issue. The fact is that given whatever
conflicting definition of hearing impairment has been offered, there still remains a sub
stantial proportion of workers harmed by either an 85 or a 90 dBA standard, and there are
approximately twice as many workers at risk at 90 dBA than as at 85 dBA. The basic issue
is whether OSHA should, under its mandate, impose additional costs on industry and
society. Further, in its proposed standard, OSHA has decided not to use as part of
material impairment the existing evidence of nonauditory harm - especially possible
implications of noise for coronary heart disease.
In the setting of other health standards, OSHA has been considerably more protective
of the worker in adopting relatively more stringent standards. Further, the courts have
upheld the OSHA protective posture as legislatively determined. In a D.C. Circuit case
1-4
challenging the asbestos standard,* Judge McGowan stated, in commenting on the
standard of review:
"there are areas where explicit factual findings are not possible, and the act of
decision is essentially a prediction based upon pure legislative judgment, as
when a Congressman decides to vote for or against a particular bill. Further
more, policy choices of this sort are not susceptible to the same type of
verification or refutation by reference to the record as are some factual
questions. Consequently, the court's approach must necessarily be different
no matter how the standards of review are labelled."
In a Second Circuit case challenging the vinyl chloride standard,** former Supreme
Court Justice Clark stated, in commenting on the asbestos case approach, "The problems
involved in according judicial review in such circumstances have been wisely discussed by
Judge McGowan." In commenting on plaintiffs contention that the available scientific
evidence does not support the 1-ppm standard, Justice Clark stated:
"We find, however, that the evidence is quite sufficient to warrant the
Secretary's choice. First, it must be remembered that we are dealing here
with human lives... . Moreover the animal exposure study ... identified fatal
liver angiosarcoma and other kidney and liver diseases at the 50 ppm level."
"As in the IUD [asbestos] case, the ultimate facts here in dispute are on the
frontiers of scientific knowledge, and though the factual finger points, it
does not conclude. Under the command of OSHA, it remains the duty of
the Secretary to act to protect the working man, and to act even in circum
stances where existing methodology or research is deficient. The Secretary,
in extrapolating the MCA [Manufacturing Chemists' Association] study's
findings from mouse to man, has chosen to reduce the permissible level to
the lowest detectable one. We find no error in this respect."
OSHA may wish to distinguish the noise standard from the standards for asbestos or
vinyl chloride, because in the latter cases, life and death issues are involved. First, the
OSHAct does not speak in terms of life and death issues and, secondly, if OSHA gives any
acknowledgment of noise as a general stressor and a cocausitive factor in coronary heart
disease and other diseases, life and death issues are involved.
industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson.
**The Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA.
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Having discussed the issues important in the rationale for standard-setting, the nature
of some of the scientific and economic issues in conflict will be discussed in the following
section.
ISSUES IN CONFLICT
The nature of the debate on some of the major issues in the current hearings are briefly
summarized in the following paragraphs. Also some new ways of looking at the data are
discussed and an attempt is made to construct an elementary balance sheet indicating the
important benefits as well as costs.
Material Impairment
The concept of material impairment has been the focus of a considerable amount of
discussion. This is not, of course, surprising in view of the legal mandate to the Secretary to
prescribe standards that, insofar as feasible, will prevent material impairment in all workers.
OSHA has explicitly accepted the AAOO lower limit for hearing handicap - a 25-dB hearing
level (Re: ISO) at the average of 0.5, 1 .0 and 2.0 kilohertz - as the dividing line for defining
the beginning of material impairment. Others have stressed the importance of hearing loss
at higher frequencies for accurate reception of speech consonants and other sounds, particu
larly under the less-than-optimal listening conditions often found in daily life. Since higher
frequencies tend to be much more vulnerable to noise, EPA believes that the OSHA defini
tion ignores losses of function that are of appreciable significance to many affected individu
als. Dr. Kryter explained in great detail the basis of this contention.
The significance of the convention used is that it determines the number of workers left
unprotected by a given level of exposure.
Effects of nonauditory harm do not figure into the OSHA definition of material impair
ment. (See following discussion of nonauditory effects.)
Quantification of Auditory Effects for 8-Hour Exposures
There has also been considerable debate over the merits of the various epidemiological
studies that have been used to describe and predict relationships between noise exposure and
hearing impairment in worker populations. EPA, in its "Levels Document" and elsewhere,
uses three data sets (from studies by Baughn, Robinson/Burns, and Passchier-Vermeer) in its
analyses, which, it contends, do not differ substantially from one another. OSHA, in its
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original response to EPA criticism of the noise standard, rejected the Baughn and Passchier-
Vermeer studies in favor of calculations based solely on the Robinson/Burns study. In these
hearings, in response, Dr. Burns himself, testifying as an EPA witness, contends that OSHA
has incorrectly applied the formula summarizing the Robinson/Burns findings in a way that
seriously understates the hearing damage to be expected under the 90-dBA standard. Dr.
Kryter, another EPA witness, agrees with the OSHA rejection of the Passchier-Vermeer form
ula, but strongly defends the Baughn study. This will be examined in more detail later. On
the other hand, many industry representatives seem to reject the results of all three studies
as inapplicable to their own workforces because the enlightened use of audiometry and
personal hearing protection tends to lessen hearing impairment. Labor and OSHA oppose
primary reliance on personal protective equipment because of unreliability and difficulty in
enforcement.
Time-Intensity Tradeoff
A further issue to be dealt with only in passing is whether the regulation should allow
a 3-dBA or a 5-dBA increase in exposure level for each halving of exposure time. The EPA
and labor positions are that the Robinson/Burns study indicates the appropriateness, for
long-term damage-predicting purposes, of equating exposures of equal energy, implying a
3-dBA trading ratio. OSHA and industry, however, relying on some experiments with
evenly spaced noise and temporary threshold shift, believe that the 5-dBA trading ratio
should be adopted.
Nonauditory Effects
OSHA takes the position that because of the uncertainties in the existing scientific
data, nonauditory effects should be essentially ignored. EPA reviews them in their levels
document and has advocated that they be considered. The NIOSH criteria document does
not deal extensively with this category of potential harm, but Dr. Finklea's testimony cites
recent NIOSH findings now in the process of final publication indicating significant noise
effects on the incidence of medical problems, absenteeism, and job accidents, and advocates
their consideration. Some implications of possible nonauditory effects of noise stress will
be discussed in some detail subsequently.
The Benefit Side and Problems of Quantification
Mr. George Eads of the Council on Wage and Price Stability contends that it is unknown
if the benefits of noise control are likely to exceed the costs based on the record to date.
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Further, he implores OSHA to "give due consideration to both benefits and costs." One may
not know if the benefits exceed the costs for two reasons: (1 ) since it is difficult - perhaps
impossible - to place a value on hearing impairment alternative valuations of this factor are
not high enough to justify the costs, or (2) that only those benefits that are easily monetarily
quantifiable in theory should be considered - such as worker compensation saved, reduced
absenteeism, and increased productivity. On the other hand, on cross-examination an OSHA
witness from BBN stated, "An incomplete calculation of benefits is worse than none at all."
EPA disagrees. Both monetarily quantifiable and nonmonetary benefits should at least be
estimated to relate to what appears to be the now sacrosanct BBN cost estimates of compliance.
Appropriate Form of the Standard
There has been considerable controversy surrounding the issue of how the workplace
noise standard should be structured. Major points of conflict have been:
• Whether industry-specific or an accross-the-board standard should be promulgated,
• The appropriate mix of engineering and administrative controls and personal pro
tective equipment,
• Whether a stricter standard should be required for newly designed workplaces, and
• The compliance time scenario.
REFERENCES
(1) Ashford, Nicholas A. Crisis in the Workplace: Occupational Disease and Injury, A
Report to the Ford Foundation. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., (November 1975).
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Section 2
ANALYSIS OF SOME ISSUES IN CONFLICT
MATERIAL IMPAIRMENT
It has already been emphasized that material impairment is fundamentally a legal/
political term, not a scientific/technical term. To the degree that the Secretary of Labor
ultimately defines it in promulgating the permanent noise standard, it will represent a
policy judgment; a political/social judgment of value — hopefully made in the awareness
of scientifically defined losses in worker health and functional capability, but not objec
tively derivable from the technical facts. Consider the hypothetical situation presented in
Figure 2-1 .
Before
Number of
People
(All ages)
Number of
People
(All ages)
25 and 50
dB Fences
Averaged at
.5, 1, and 2 kHz
25 and 50 dB
Fences Averaged
at 1, 2, and
3 kHz
25 50
Figure 2-1 . Hypothetical hearing level distributions in workers
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The solid curves in the upper part of the figure represent the distributions of hearing
levels expected in the population before, and many years after, a hypothetical noise regulation
is imposed. The solid curve in the lower part of the figure represents the distribution of hearing
levels if somehow all workplace noise exposure were halted. Defining all aspects of the
differences between these three distributions* is as far as one can get by objective technical
criteria. Clearly, in this example essentially the whole population has somewhat better
hearing after the regulation than before, but they are essentially all still impaired to some
degree when compared with hearing levels they would enjoy if noise exposures were reduced
to the point at which there was absolutely no effect. Whose impairment should be labeled
material for purposes of social decision-making on standards? It depends on the relative
judgment of value one wishes to assign to various degrees of functional capacity.
Some assignments of value can be made in a variety of ways. The beginning of one
type of value judgment is to summarize the differences between the curves by drawing one
or another of the broken lines (fences) indicated in Figure 2-1 and categorize the moving
of an individual from one side of the line to the other as a material impairment. This is the
type of value judgment implicit in the risk calculations of the OSHA Environmental Impact
Statement and the calculations to be presented subsequently. Which horizontal scale one
uses to define "hearing level" depends on a judgment of which hearing frequencies are of
social value, and exactly where the line is drawn depends on a judgment of the approximate
point at which a socially undesirable loss of function has taken place.** However, it is clear
that if OSHA determines that all individuals above a given hearing level (whatever the scale)
should be labelled materially impaired, and if the facts are as sketched in the figures, then
the only basis under the Act by which OSHA can choose a regulation that increases the
number of individuals above the fence would be a determination that a stricter regulation
would not be feasible.
including the time it would take to achieve various intermediate hearing level distri
butions and the communication and other difficulties observable at different hearing levels.
(This will be covered in the following section.)
**In doing this, however, it must be understood that: (1) one is assigning no social
value to the changes in hearing levels of those people who do not cross the line (both those
which, without noise, would have hearing levels very much better than the fence level, and
those which, without noise, would have hearing levels already worse than the fence level);
the actual significance of the change in hearing levels to those individuals moved across the
line will be less than the average difference between all those above and all those below
the given fence. If one bears in mind the presence of both of these opposing distortions,
this technique for summarizing the data can be used as a basis forjudging the value of
alternative regulations.
■>_->
Table 2-1 illustrates this point with actual data from the Baughn study1 and a study
conducted by NIOSH,^ and for the AAOO's 25 dB fence averaged at 0.5, 1, and 2 kHz, and
for several alternative fences which have been or might be suggested in its place. It can be
Table 2-1
Percent impaired with different definitions of impairments*
Baughn Data NIOSH Data
Age: 46-54** 46-54**
Exposure Level: 85 90 85 90
Fence:
15dB(.5, 1,2 kHz)
Total 83 89
Presbycusis 75 75
Net 8 14
20 dB(.5, 1,2 kHz)
Total 50 61
Presbycusis 39 39
Net 11 22
25 dB (.5, 1,2 kHz)
Total 26 36 19 31
Presbycusis 17 17 10 10
Net 9 19 9 21
25 dB (1,2, 3 kHz)
Total 30 43
Presbycusis 18 18
Net 12 25
50 dB(.5, 1,2 kHz)
Total 1.5 2
Presbycusis 1 1
Net .5 1
*Percent exceeding different "fences..
**Between 31 and 32 years average exposure.
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seen that although the total numbers of people considered impaired rises with each lowering
(movement to the left on Figure 2-1) of the fence, so does the "presbycusis" correction
(numbers of people who would be impaired to that degree in the absence of noise) which
must be subtracted from the total.
The controversy surrounding the issues of how to define the fence has little to do with
the issue of the benefit gained by adopting an 85 dBA as opposed to a 90 dBA standard.
For reasonable fence values, the number of workers additionally benefitted, i.e., prevented
from crossing the fence remains approximately the same. Further, even at the rather
unreasonable fence value of 50 dB, differences between no exposure (presbycusis), 85 dBA
exposure, and 90 dBA exposure are still apparent. Note that about twice as many addi
tional people are harmed at 90 dBA as at 85 dBA. Whatever the fence used, there are con
siderably more workers impaired than no employee — and that, not the exact definition of
material impairment, is the issue.
An alternative way of defining "material impairment" is implicit in EPA's summari
zation of data in the Levels document.-^ EPA makes the value judgment that "any measur
able hearing loss at any frequency is unacceptable if the goal is protection of health and
welfare with an adequate margin of safety." EPA stresses the importance for daily life
of the high frequencies neglected in the AAOO criteria and chooses for special attention
the most sensitive frequency for noise-induced damage (4000 Hz). Summarizing the hearing
loss data for this frequency is Figure 2-2.
90
70
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Percentage of Population
Figure 2-2. Percentage of exposed population that will incur no more than 5 dB NIPTS
shown as a function of exposure level. Population ranked by decreasing
ability to hear at 4000 Hz. (See appendix C for rationale.)
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EPA concludes that the 8-hour exposure level which protects virtually the entire population
from greater than 5 dB NIPTS* is 73 dB. Recognizing the difficulties in achieving this low
a noise level in the near future, EPA has, of course, advocated the much less protective 85
dBA level for 8 hours as an interim goal.
EPA points out that the AAOO fence was originated for purposes of workmen's com
pensation, in order to define the point of beginning handicap. Whether beginning handicap
and material impairment should be regarded as equivalent is open to question.**
The choice in defining material impairment between OSHA's current criteria, EPA's
criteria, or something in between, depends on the interpretation of the fundamental value
judgment made by Congress when it concluded the term in its legislative mandate to the
Secretary of Labor. However, no matter what definition of material impairment is used, no
standard presently proposed comes very close to assuring that no employee suffer that
impairment.
Further, it should be recognized that the entire discussion so far, omits from considera
tion of material impairment the nonauditory effects. We shall return to these in a subsequent
section.
HEARING IMPAIRMENT IN THE UNITED STATES - CURRENT AND EXPECTED
LEVELS UNDER DIFFERENT OSHA STANDARDS
In this section, an attempt to arrive at as clear as possible a picture of the expected
payoff, in terms of fewer people with various degrees of hearing impairment, from alterna
tive noise regulations. Such calculations inevitably involve numerous assumptions and
considerable uncertainty. Therefore, before presenting the numbers in detail, it is impor
tant to be clear about exactly what they are based on, and throughout the discussion an
indication of how changes in assumptions would affect the results will be attempted.
*Noise induced permanent threshhold shift.
**EPA's Dr. Alvin Meyer in his OSHA testimony took the position that it would be
unreasonable to set a noise exposure standard at a level where a substantial portion of the
exposed population would develop compensable hearing losses. Furthermore, for standard-
setting purposes, material impairment should be considered to begin before hearing loss which
is defined as a compensable handicap.
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Estimates of Noise Exposure
Current Noise Exposure
One of the most serious sources of uncertainty in attempting to quantify the benefits
that will occur from changing the world in the ways proposed in the regulations, is that there
is inadequate data on the state of the world we are attempting to change. Just how many
people are exposed to how much noise today? NIOSH has collected extensive data on noise
exposures in workplaces representative of American industry as part of their National Occu
pational Hazard Survey. Unfortunately, these data, which should be reasonably definitive
within the constraints of the sampling procedure used, have not yet been put together in a
form which allows publication and use. Table 2-2, however, presents a preliminary summary
from these data of the percentage of work facilities with at least some workers exposed to
more than 85 dBA. It is clear that compliance with a regulation set at the 85 dBA level is
likely to affect the majority of workplaces in most categories of manufacturing industry,
although quantification of the actual number of workers affected must await the publication
of the full NIOSH data.
Table 2-3 gives some indication of the percentages of workplaces in various industrial
categories currently being cited by OSHA as in violation of the current 90 dBA standard, at
least in one State (Ohio) in one recent fiscal year (1973). This, again, does not tell the num
ber of workers whose noise exposures are actually being reduced by current regulatory
enforcement activity, but it does suggest that even in industrial categories where noise is
most prevalent, only about a quarter of OSHA inspections result in remedial discipline.
Table 2-4 represents the best available guesses (by Bolt, Baranek, and Newman in their
1974 report to OSHA) of the number of workers currently exposed to noise levels in excess
of 85 and 90 dBA in different industrial categories. BBN properly emphasizes the conjec
tural nature of these figures, but, coming from a firm with extensive experience in the noise
control field, such estimates must be regarded as relatively well-informed conjecture. There
being no better data presently available, they will be used as a basis for the calculations
below.
However, in order to begin the calculations, it is necessary to know not only how many
workers are over and under 85 dBA and 90 dBA, but approximately how many are over, and
under, by various amounts. Based on its experience, BBN estimated the numbers of workers
in various 5-dBA groups from 80-84 to 115-119 and found that over 90 dBA, the number of
workers exposed dropped by approximately half with each 5-dBA increment in level. Based
on this rule, and placing all those not at 85 or over at 80-84, the following exposure distribu
tion is presented in Table 2-5.
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Table 2-3
OSHA noise citations by industry, Ohio, fiscal 1973*
Number of
inspections
Number of Citations
SIC Industry noise
citations
per
inspection
15 Building construction 129 4 0.03
16 Other construction 45 0 0
17 Special trade contractors 407 0 0
20 Food and kindred products 58 6 .10
21 Tobacco manufacturers 3 0 0
22 Textile mill products 19 4 .21
23 Apparel and other finished textile products 12 0 0
24 Lumber and wood products (except
furniture) 31 5 .16
25 Furniture and fixtures 36 8 .22
26 Paper and allied products 53 15 .28
27 Printing, publishing and allied industries 27 6 .22
28 Chemical and allied products 68 4 .06
29 Petroleum and related industries 8 0 0
30 Rubber and plastics 144 7 .05
31 Leather and leather products 10 1 .10
32 Stone, clay, glass and concrete products 112 9 .08
33 Primary metal industries 333 56 .17
34 Fabricated metal products 237 56 .23
35 Machinery, except electrical 258 22 .09
36 Electrical and electrical machinery, equip
ment supplies 104 10 .08
37 Transportation equipment 125 17 .14
38 Measuring and medical instruments,
optical goods 19 0 0
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing 29 0 0
40 Railroad transportation 8 0 0
41 Local, suburban, and interurban highway
passenger transport 5 0 0
42 Motor freight transportation and warehouse 47 0 0
44 Water transportation 105 2 .02
45 Transportation by air 10 0 0
47 Transportation services 2 1 .50
48 Communication 21 0 0
50 Wholesale trade 81 0 0
52-59 Retail trade 31 0 0
60-91 Services 60 0 0
Total 2637 233 .09
*Data from D. Hattis et al., Information for decision-making on occupational safety and
health problems in Ohio (1974), Table 26.
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Table 2-4
Estimate of the number and percentage of production
workers overexposed to noise*
SIC
Code
Production Overexposed Percentage
overexposedIndustry workers
(thousands)
workers
(thousands)
85 dBA 90 dBA 85 dBA 90 dBA
Food 20 1 170 820 350 70 30
Tobacco 21 63 48 40 76 63
Textiles 22 900 855 765 95 85
Apparel 23 1174 12 0 1 0
Lumber and wood 24 542 542 390 100 72
Furniture and fixtures 25 427 235 58 55 15
Paper 26 557 395 206 71 37
Printing and publishing 27 661 132 99 20 15
Chemicals 28 596 137 66 23 11
Petroleum and coal 29 117 58 23 50 20
Rubber and plastics 30 531 266 106 50 20
Leather 31 256 3 0 1 0
Stone, clay, and glass 32 555 416 139 75 25
Primary metals 33 989 577 259 58 26
Primary steel 331 485 325 170 67 35injjZ,
Foundries 336 275 189 54 70 20
333,
Primary nonferrous 334, 233 63 35 27 15
335
Fabricated metals ""34 1 123 786 225 70 20
Machinery except
electrical 35 1366 956 273 70 20
Electrical machinery 36 1370 959 274 70 20
Transportation equipment 37 1354 880 284 65 21
Utilities 49 627 445 188 71 30
Total 14382 8524 3755 59.3 26.1
* The majority of these estimates are the result of informal discussions with industry
spokesmen who were willing to discuss the subject. There is very little definitive information
available - therefore, these estimates should be viewed as best guesses.
t Employment and Earnings, Vol. 20, No. 2 (August 1973), U.S. Department of Labor,
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Source: Bolt, Beranek and Newman, Inc., Impact of Noise Control at the Workplace,
Report No. 2671, Cambridge, Mass., January 1974, p. C-2.
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Table 2-5
Current exposure estimates used in calculations
Approximate continuous Thousands Percent
exposure level of workers* of workers
80- 84 "82" 5,858 40.7
85- 89 "87" 4,769 33.2
90- 94 "92" 1,878 13.1
95- 99 939 6.5
100-104 "102" 469 3.3
105-109 "107" 235 1.6
110-114 "112" 117 .8
115-119 "117" 117 .8
Total 14,382 100.0
*These are total numbers of workers at each exposure level.
Later workers will be excluded under twenty and over 65 to arrive
at slightly reduced figures.
It should be noted that two other (we feel, erroneous) versions of this same exposure
distribution exist, based on the same data. BBN themselves in the appendix to their report,
where they calculate the numbers of people they believe will suffer hearing handicap (impair
ment), present the following distribution in Table 2-6. Contact was made with the former
BBN employee who drew up this table and did the risk calculations based on it, and were
informed that the exposure levels indicated really represent the lower bounds on the range
of exposures of each group, and the appropriate range designations are as shown in Table 2-5
and as shown in the front of the BBN report.* ■
The other erroenous version of this exposure distribution is contained in the tables giving
risk calculations in the OSHA Draft Environmental Impact Statement, reproduced in Table 2-7
Here all of the groups are shifted downward in their assigned exposure ranges by 5 dBA. How
ever, OSHA does not use the centers of the ranges shown to derive the risk percentages indi
cated in the percent impaired column. The figures for this column are directly derived from
*Nevertheless, it appears that in doing the actual risk calculations BBN used these lower
bounds as if they were the mean value for each group, and therefore their estimates of impair
ment are somewhat lower than they would otherwise be.
2-11
Table 2-6
Current exposure estimates used by BBN in
calculating expected hearing handicap*
Exposure level
dBA
Percent of workers in industries
covered by BBN study
Under 85 30
85 40
90 15
95 7
100 4
105 2
110 1
115 1
*Source: Bolt, Beranek and Newman, Inc., Impact
ofNoise Control at the Workplace, Report No. 2671,
Cambridge, Mass. (January 1974), p. C-2.
Table 2-7
Hearing impairment after 40 years exposure according to Baughn
Correct Level Percent Presently L <
90 dBA standard
numbers in thousands)
85 dBA standard
ranges dBA impaired Number Number Number Number Number Number
dBA exposed impaired exposed impaired exposed impaired
80- 84 < 80 4,315 4,315 13,231
85- 89 80- 85 8.0 5,753 460 8,917 713 575 46
90- 94 85- 90 18.0 2,157 388 575 104 288 52
94- 99 90- 95 28.0 1,007 282 288 81 144 40
100-104 95-100 40.0 575 230 144 58 144 58
105-109 100-105 54.0 288 156 144 78
110-114 105-1 10 64.0 144 92
> 115 110-115 70.0 144 101
Total 1,709 1,034 196
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the table on page D-4 of the BBN report. Therefore, OSHA has made no additional error,
over and above BBN's error, in calculating the numbers of workers expected to be impaired.
However, they have placed the workers in the wrong exposure ranges. We point this out in
particular because of Mr. Eads' statement that:
"The Bolt Study, using the 25 dB hearing risk method, estimates that 770,000
workers would benefit; while OSHA's estimate using the same hearing risk
standard as Bolt is that only 73,000 additional workers would be protected
from the 25 dB hearing loss."
It is possible that other hearing risk calculations performed by OSHA from the indicated
exposure distribution may have lead to confusion.
Noise Exposures After Compliance with 90 or 85 dBA Regulations
To determine the hearing conservation benefits of the 90 or 85 dBA standards, the next
step is to determine how the current exposure levels indicated in Table 2-5 would be changed
on compliance with the new rules. Table 2-8 is a reconstruction of BBN's appraisal of the
changes in exposure that would occur.
Table 2-8*
Percent of production workers exposed
to specified noise level
Under 90 dBA
criterion
Under 85 dBA
criterionNoise level Currently
80- 84 30 30 92
85- 89 40 62 4
90- 94 15 4 2
95- 99 7 2 1
100-104 4 1 1
105-109 2 1 0
110-114 1 0 0
115-119 1 0 0
The original BBN table has been altered to reflect the appropriate
noise exposure ranges.
Source: Reconstructed from Bolt, Beranek and Newman, Inc., Impact
ofNoise Control at the Workplace, Report No. 2671, Cambridge, Mass.
(January 1974), p. C-2.
2-13
Table 2-8 indicates an expectation that industry will respond to a 90 dBA regulation by
lowering the exposure levels of nearly all those exposed to 90 and above to the 85-89 range
(average 87 dBA), and that industry will respond to an 85 dBA regulation by bringing 92
percent of all workers down into the 80-84 dBA range (average 82 dBA).
This raises a difficult question. It is somewhat disturbing, for the purpose of calculating
benefits, to assume that industry will comply to levels averaging 3 dBA below what is actually
required by the regulations. Assuming such overcompliance might tend to unrealistically
magnify the hearing conservation that should be expected to be achieved by either regulation.
It is true that there are factors that might tend to produce overcompliance in industry in
response to the regulation:
• Plants making engineering changes for noise control purposes might tend to over-
engineer to be on the safe side, and
• For firms to bring the worker with the job in the noisiest location in the plant
down to the mandated level, the exposures of most other workers in inherently
less noisy plant locations might be incidentally reduced to considerably below the
mandated level.
However, it seems that there are other factors that weigh in an equally compelling manner on
the side of producing a general undercompliance in industry with mandated noise levels:
• The practical realities of inspection and citation procedures prevent effective enforce
ment of any regulation down to the last decibel. For example, noise dosimeters can
not be relied upon to be perfectly accurate and the need to be able to prove noncom
pliance beyond a reasonable doubt means that apparent violations less than 3 dBA
in excess of the standard will rarely result in citations. Additionally, managements
may cometimes successfully escape citations by altering normal operating practices
on the day of inspection. For example, particularly noisy pieces of equipment may
not be used.
• Even if a company is cited and brought into compliance once, there will be a
tendency for noise levels to rise with time as equipment deteriorates, goes without
lubrication, and from other causes. Because the current OSHA and State inspection
forces are rather small compared with the number of workplaces there are to inspect,
there can be no expectation that the average workplace will be subject to possible
enforcement more frequently than once every several years. With little incentive
to comply during these many-year intervals, it seems overly optimistic to expect
rigorous compliance with the regulations at all times for all companies.
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Considering these aspects of practical enforcement, tending to produce undercompliance,
together with the other factors listed tending to produce overcompliance, preference to
assume that industry's performance on the average will more closely approximate the minimal
requirements of the law, rather than the overcompliance implied in a literal interpretation of
BBN's appraisal. For purposes of calculations, assumptions that the effect of compliance with
the 90 dBA regulation will simply be to bring all workers currently above 90 dBA to 90 dBA,
and the effect of the 85 dBA regulation will be to bring all workers currently above 85 dBA
down to 85 dBA.
Mode of Compliance
In the calculations of the hearing improvements to be expected from alternative noise
regulations, one further simplifying assumption about worker exposure levels after compliance
needs clarification. Assuming that while the noise regulation causes all workers above the
mandated level to be brought down to the mandated level, assurances have been made that
the regulation will cause no significant change in the noise exposures of workers currently
below the mandated level. The previous discussion, where tendencies for overcompliance*
were balanced against tendencies for undercompliance** applies only if the major mode of
compliance is by engineering methods (where either the noise emission is reduced at the
source or the path from the source to the worker is partially blocked). However, for some
types of administrative controls where workers from quiet jobs are rotated to noisy jobs for
part of the day, and workers from noisy jobs are rotated to quiet jobs for part of the day,
compliance with the regulation will be accompanied by increases in noise exposures for some
workers. This clearly spreads the risk of hearing impairment, although the risk to the particular
individuals rotated partially out of noisy jobs is somewhat reduced. However, when one
examines existing data*** relating noise exposure to hearing loss, the overall effect of rotating
on the worker population as a whole is always or nearly always worse in one sense than not
rotating. More workers experience worse hearing levels than if the job rotation measures had
not been implemented. If the goal of the noise regulations is to improve the hearing of the
worker population as a whole, rather than to be more evenly harmful to workers, this type of
administrative control should be actively discouraged by noise regulations instead of being
* Including particularly incidental reduction of the exposures of workers below stan
dard by the quieting of machines producing excessive exposures to some workers. In other
words, in some cases to bring the most exposed worker down to 90 dBA, the exposures of
workers at greater distances from the source may be reduced considerably below 90 dBA.
**See previous discussion for listing.
***From either the Baughn or the'Robinson studies to be further discussed.
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allowed as one mode of compliance. Discouragement of this type of compliance might be
incorporated in the regulation by language providing that noise control programs should not
increase either the number of workers exposed to 80 dBA and above, or the exposures of
individual workers already exposed above 80 dBA prior to the institution of the noise control
program. It should also be noted that the use of a 3 dB, rather than a 5 dB, time-intensity
trading ratio would also help discourage undesirable types of administrative control.
Other types of administrative controls, however, such as shifting noisy operations to
periods of the day when fewer workers are present, do reduce overall population exposure to
noise and remain as modes of compliance preferable to personal protective devices.
Finally, it should be noted that the calculations assume no net effect on hearing levels
for the audiometric programs mandated by the standard. This is a difficult question, as there
is no data at all on which to base a nationwide projection of anticipated impact. It can
certainly be expected that some companies will have excellent programs of monitoring and
providing information to the worker, and that some of these companies' workers may be
persuaded by the evidence of their own deterioration in hearing levels to be more consistent
users of personal protection. Unfortunately, it does not seem that the past history of indus
trial medical programs (in all but a few outstanding exceptions) justifies the expectation that
this will generally be the case. Further, to the degree that the results of audiometric examina
tion encourage administrative job rotation or job mobility, there may actually be a larger
number harmed in the worker population as a whole. With these uncertainties, the audiom
etry zero effect has therefore been assigned.
Relationships Between Noise Exposure and Hearing Impairment
A brief discussion of the sources of data helpful in quantifying the relationship between
noise exposure and permanent threshold shift is necessary.
The Public Health Service has published the most recent and definitive data on the
hearing levels of the population as a whole. These are based on a 1962 survey of a representa
tive sample of the United States. Because only a small proportion of the representative
sample is industrial workers exposed to long periods of noise, it is certainly likely to be an
underestimate of the present pattern to be found among industrial workers working in noisy
environments.
The second set of data is a British study by Burns and Robinson. The authors screened
out workers with otological abnormalities, and measured hearing levels in ways comparable
with the Public Health Service techniques. In particular, a sufficient amount of time was
allowed, between noise exposure and time of testing, that temporary threshold shifts did not
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confuse the data. They concentrated on measuring the differences among those people
exposed to different noise levels during their working life, quantifying the total noise exposure
of each particular individual utilizing the equal energy principle. (This study, as has been
discussed in the testimony of Dr. Burns, validates the use of this rule in calculating equivalent
continuous exposure levels.)
The third set of data is a study of a large American industrial population by Baughn.
No otological screening and selection was carried out, making it more likely to be representa
tive of actual industrial worker groups. However, he admittedly did not wait a long enough
time to avoid the confusion of the data by some degree of temporary threshold shift. Baughn's
assumption on presbycusis is that a 78 dBA exposure for 8 hours or the equivalent produces
no greater hearing loss in the normal population than does aging in the normal population.
This is supported by comparison with a survey by Glorig of a non-noise exposed population.
All the calculations are based on the Baughn data.* In using the Baughn data, some
important issues must be explicitly addressed:
• The Baughn data include otologically abnormal people. It is desirable to have
otologically abnormal people in the sample for our purposes, because the results
more accurately reflect the impact of noise on defective, as well as normal, ears.
People with defective ears are likely, in any event, to be somewhat impaired to
begin with, and therefore are of special concern because it is probably worse to
make fair hearing poor than to make good hearing fair.
• The Baughn data include some temporary threshold shift. This is troublesome, but
as has been discussed at length in Dr. Kryter's testimony, the effect is not large —
less than 2 dB of hearing level even in the most extreme subgroups, and generally
less than 1 dB.** A partial compensating advantage is that a threshold shift which
is experienced throughout every working day and into the evening of working days
is in itself not totally negligible as a social cost, even though each day's shift is
labelled "temporary."
• The Baughn data indicate larger effects of noise on hearing levels than some other
data, particularly the exceedingly careful study of Robinson and Burns. If, as has
been suggested,4* 10 dB are added to the Robinson threshold shifts to compensate
for the screening out of otologically abnormal people, there is not a great deal of
difference in the data sets. All concerned, however, prefer not to rely heavily on
*Specifically, Figures 9 and 1 1 of Reference 1.
**By "hearing level" is meant average hearing level at (.5, 1 , 2 kHz).
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the quantitative accuracy of this latter procedure. An additional source of evidence
is the recent study of NIOSH. As can be seen in the table presented in the discussion
of "Material Impairment", after subtracting the different presbycusis corrections
appropriate to each data set, there is very little difference between the noise-
induced risk found in the two studies. The NIOSH data basically confirm the
expected risk percentages found by Baughn for a general, unscreened population.
Finally, to avoid another source of possible future confusion, the Baughn risk percentages
used are not identical to the Baughn risk percentages used by BBN. BBN drew their percent
ages from Table 8 of reference' that includes an adjustment of the actual observed hearing
levels to set the median hearing level to 0 dB for the group at 80 dBA exposure and 20 years
of age. This would be appropriate if the worker group were considered to begin their working
lives with hearing levels, on the average, no worse than those of the general population. How
ever, the working population exposed to noise probably tends to be of lower average socio
economic status and educational attainment than the population as a whole. Certainly gener
ally excluded from the noise group are the relatively high status white-collar workers. Pre
sented will be Public Health Service data in the Equity section which shows that there is a
relatively strong correlation between educational level and hearing level, even at younger age
groups (possibly due to the effects on hearing level of infectious disease, and the effects on
educational attainment of bad hearing). This being the case, it should be expected that noise-
exposed workers may already begin at age 20 with hearing levels somewhat poorer than the
general population average. Exactly what the magnitude of this effect might be cannot be
said, but particularly since the Baughn data came from such a large industrial population it is
more likely to be appropriate not to adjust the data. In any event, the differences are gener
ally small, after subtracting out the different presbycusis corrections (80 dBA exposure group)
appropriate for each data set.
Quantification of Noise-Induced Hearing Impairment Now Occurring, and the
Hearing Improvement Which Could Be Expected From Different OSHA Standards
The figure below depicts two hypothetical population distributions of hearing ability
before and many years after compliance with some regulation.
Number of
People
Hearing Level
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There are two general ways to describe this change for use in describing the benefit of the
regulation :
• One can determine the amount (in decibels at specific frequencies) that the whole
curve, or selected parts of it such as the median, 90th percentile points, etc., are
shifted as a result of the regulation, or
• One can determine the numbers of people with hearing worse than one or more
arbitrary cut-off points ("fences"), before and after the regulation. (Commonly
this is referred to as the "risk" method.)
Both methods are valid ways of looking at the data as long as one bears in mind the
limitations of each particular technique. The first method gives results in a form (dB shifts)
that does not lend itself to easy translation into terms of intuitive individual and social sig
nificance. The second method tends to obscure the continuous nature of hearing impairment
and can lead the unwary to ignore the fact that the entire population is impaired by noise,
not just those who happen to be moved across the arbitrarily-designated "fences."
Considerable data utilizing the former method of presentation is assembled in the EPA
levels document and supplements. For the calculations, however, results by the "risk"
method are presented, in order to provide as clear as possible a basis for social decision-making.
Baughn^ and others have conducted surveys in which people were asked, simply, "How
well do you hear?" Results in terms of the numbers of people of different ages responding
"good," "fair," "poor," and "deaf are shown in Figure 2-3 correlated with the average of
the subjects' audiometric hearing levels at 500, 1000, and 2000 hertz. It is clear that the
audiometric hearing levels can be translated into rough subjective categories that have social
meaning. It is likely that individuals do not respond to fair or poor unless they have noticed
at least some interference with the activities they carry out in daily life.* Less noticeable
degrees of functional impairment are by no means without social cost. However this kind of
information at least indicates that people with average hearing levels in these frequencies
above 25 dB (ISO) are close to the border between hearing that is good and that which is
fair, and that people with levels above 50 dB (ISO) generally place themselves in the poor
category. These are the two fences we will use in our calculations. Additional information on
the social meaning of these hearing levels can be gleaned by the reader from the following cap
sule descriptions by the Public Health Service.6
*A tendency for older people to classify themselves by less stringent criteria than
younger people probably results from the fact that older people probably tend to compare
their own hearing with that of other older people, who also show hearing loss because of
their age.
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Average hearing level
at .5, l,and 2 kHz
in the better ear Re: ISO
Ability to understand speech
Less than 25 dB No significant difficulty with
faint speech
25-39 dB Difficulty only with faint
speech
40-54 dB Frequent difficulty with normal
speech
55-69 dB Frequent difficulty with loud
speech
These may be somewhat conservative statements of the handicaps experienced by
declines in quality of life experienced by those with noise-damaged hearing. As was noted
in the material impariment section, there is considerable evidence that the three frequencies
averaged to obtain these hearing levels (.5, 1 , and 2 kHz) are not the only frequencies of
social significance. In particular, hearing at higher frequencies, which shows more suscepti
bility to both age- and noise-induced impairment, has been suggested as a better barometer
of noise-induced damage. Considerations of higher frequencies are not included in the cal
culations, however, because of limitations in the data base readily available and interpretable
in social terms. However, it seems reasonable to believe that the results expressed in terms
of the three lower frequencies will provide a result that would roughly correlate with a result
based on an appropriately-weighted index of hearing levels at all frequencies.
The ultimate output of the calculations will therefore be expressed as the net number
of individuals with hearing levels in two ranges:
25-50 dB (average HL at .5, 1 , and 2 kHz)
over 50 dB (average HL at .5, 1 , and 2 kHz)
after subtracting out the individuals that would be in those two hearing level ranges in the
absence of noise above 90 dBA ("presbycusis" correction).
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Assumptions of the Calculations
Some assumptions have already been discussed in the section on noise exposures. Other
assumptions implicit in the calculations are :
• Noise exposure is independent of the age of workers - that is, older workers are
exposed to various noise levels just as frequently as younger workers.
• Exposure is simply proportional to age, beginning at age 20.
• The age distribution of workers approximates that reported in the 1 970 census,
for manufacturing industries. (Table 2-9)
Table 2-9
Age distribution of workers*
Thousands of
Age Percent workers**
16-17 1.059 152
18-19 3.345 481
20-24 11.959 1,720
25-29 12.330 1,773
30-34 10.755 1,547
35^4 22.289 3,206
45-54 22.329 3,211
55-59 8.536 1,228
60-64 5.230 752
> 64 2.168 312
Subtotal:
20-64 93.427 13,437
Total:
16-64+ 99.499 14,382
Totals may not add because of rounding.
*From male and female distributions of age levels
in manufacturing industries - 1970 census.
**In 1973 for industries covered by the BBN study.
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• The equal energy principle can be used to convert long- and short-term interrupted
exposures into equivalent continuous exposures.
• The 80 dBA risk curves given by Baughn^ represent expected hearing loss due to
presbycusis and all other non-noise-induced hearing loss in the potentially exposed
worker population (called "presbycusis" hereafter, for brevity).
• Job mobility is independent of noise exposure — that is, workers do not leave
noisier jobs at any faster rate than they leave quieter jobs.
Detailed Questions Addressed by the Calculations
Most previous calculations in this field have chosen a single, or a few, durations of
exposure and estimated the degree of hearing impairment produced as people attain those
designated exposure times. The BBN study, for example, estimates the numbers of people
in their selected industries* which will suffer at least 25 dB or worse hearing levels (Re: ISO)
as they reach age 60. This is done for three conditions:
• The present conditions of noise in those factories estimated by BBN with no change;
• That which might occur as a result of the adoption of a 90 dBA standard; and the
third
• That corresponding to an 85 dBA standard.
Since workers reach age 60 at different times, this presentation of the data in itself is not as
useful as asking what the situation might be 10 years from now, 20 years from now, and 40
years from now, for the existing worker population, given their existing age distribution.**
This is central for determining the effects of policies adopted now at various times on the
existing populations, whether or not we apply a social discount rate other than zero.***
*Comprising a total population of 14 million workers. These industries include most
of the industrial categories with serious noise problems, with the conspicuous exceptions of
mining and agriculture. Implicitly, the BBN data also assume no job mobility.
**Some information of this sort is, however, presented by BBN graphically.
***As an aside, it should be noted here that the benefits of noise reduction do increase
as time goes on, while the costs of compliance must be admitted to have to be imposed at
this time in the present. However, it also should be pointed out that some of the nonauditory
effects, particularly some of those associated with job performance and stress, might be
experienced at this time, rather than later on. That is, current with the exposure, and hence
any estimate of the nonauditory relative to the auditory harm, ought to take into account
the differences in time frames in which these benefits are manifest.
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As a result of these considerations it was chosen to first seek an answer to the question:
"Under four different strategies now adopted, what will be the hearing level profile of the
workers in these industries 40 years from now?" The industrial categories chosen are the
same as those used by BBN. To do this calculation properly, one has to know first what the
age distribution will be 40 years from now, and secondly, one must make some assumptions
about what the noise profile will be in these same industrial locations between now and 40
years from now. Rather than going to extensive calculations ofwhat the population distribu
tion will be 40 years from now, we will assume the present age distribution in the population.
Note that this will be an underestimate of the threshold shift likely to be encountered because
the average age of the worker is moving upwards and presbycusis and noise will have more
marked effects in somewhat older worker groups. It should also be noted that there will be
a larger work force 40 years from now. To gain information for a more near-term period,
also investigated were the effects of two compliance strategies on hearing levels to be expected
10 years from now.
One of the four compliance strategies is a baseline case — that is, the extent to which
the actual noise in these industrial operations may change, in the absence of regulation. For
this case, the assumption that there will be no change is made, recognizing that there are
arguments both for and against this assumption. The arguments for an increase in the noise
level are based on the extrapolation of past history; the argument for a smaller noise level is
a postulated greater noise consciousness and worker resistance which may stimulate changes
which have not been manifest in the last 20 years. Using this approach, predictions are then
generated of the excess numbers of people which will cross the two selected fences (25 and
50 dB ISO) under the following four conditions of compliance with noise exposure
regulations :
• No change from existing noise exposure,
• All exposures above 100 dBA brought down to 100 dBA,
• All exposures above 90 dBA brought down to 90 dBA, and
• All exposures above 85 dBA brought down to 85 dBA.
As discussed previously, in all cases no changes are assumed in the exposures of those
exposed to less than the mandated regulatory levels.
In addition to these differing exposure conditions, investigated are the effects of assum
ing three different degrees of job mobility in the population:
• No job mobility (one job per worker throughout a working lifetime).
2-24
• Some job mobility (three jobs to date in each present worker's employment
history, no more than one of which is greater than 80 dBA, the others being equal
to 80 dBA).
• Infinite job mobility (all noise exposures are evenly distributed among all workers
in a total worker population age 20-64 of 80 million, otherwise exposed to the
equivalent of 80 dBA).
Calculations were performed by first setting forth a detailed population by age and
equivalent continuous exposure distribution* under each hypothesized compliance strategy
and then multiplying by the appropriate risk percentages derived from the Baughn curves to
arrive at the numbers of individuals expected in designated hearing level ranges. The only
other consideration noted here, is that the results presented in the next section are based on
the worker population falling within the 20-64 age group (inclusive). Workers falling outside
these limits were excluded for lack of data.
Results and Discussion
Table 2-10 gives the expected results at the ultimate 40-year post-compliance time point
and Table 2-1 1 gives the expected results, 10 years after compliance. Several aspects of the
data are worthy of note.
Job Mobility
The assumption of infinite job mobility spectacularly increases the numbers of people
one expects to experience impaired hearing due to noise. It should be noted, however,** that
the very high numbers for the present exposures category for infinite job mobility are greatly
influenced by the small numbers of workers in the highest noise exposure groups (117 and
1 12 dBA). Since the estimates of the numbers of workers exposed to these extreme noise
levels are likely to be much more uncertain than the estimates at lower noise levels, this calcu
lation must be regarded as highly conjectural.
* Where groups of individuals were hypothesized to have exposures of different
intensities during their work experience, energy - equivalent continuous exposure levels
were computed, as described in the EPA Levels document.^ (e.g., 5 years at 85 + 2 years
at 90 = 7 years at 87.09; 5 years at 85 + 2 years at 95 = 7 years at 90.53)
** See appendix for additional detail.
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Table 2-10
Excess number of workers impaired due to noise (thousands)
40 years after compliance summary
Present noise exposures:
Added number at Job Mobility
hearing level None Some Infinite
(Re: ISO)* 1 job per worker 3 jobs per worker (Eq. 91.13 dBA) for
80 million people
noise exposure evenly
distributed through
out workforce.
25-50 1,429 2,632 12,034
> 50 222 384 1,230
If all above 100 dBA are brought to 100 dBA:
Added number at Job Mobility
hearing level None Some Infinite
(Re: ISO)* 1 job per worker 3 jobs per worker (Eq. 85.07 dBA)
25-50 1,328 2,365 5,219
> 50 150 261 568
If all above 90 dBA are brought to 90 dBA:
AHHeH number at Job Mobility
hearing level None Some Infinite
(Re: ISO)* 1 job per worker 3 jobs per worker (Eq. 82.20 dBA)
25-50 1,002 1,607 2,220
> 50 104 176 250
If all above 85 dBA are brought to 85 dBA:
Added number at Job Mobility
hearing level None Some Infinite
(Re: ISO)* 1 job per worker 3 jobs per worker (Eq. 80.99 dBA)
25-50 638 872 995
> 50 72 98 113
*[l/3 (500, 1000,2000 Hz)].
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Table 2-1 1
Excess number of workers impaired due to noise (thousands)
10 years after compliance summary
If all above 90 dBA are brought to 90 dBA:
Added number at
hearing level
(Re: ISO)*
Job Mobility
None Some Infinite
1 job per worker 3 jobs per worker
25-50 1,238 2,184 9,690
> 50 182 303 1,175
If all above 85 dBA are brought to 85 dBA:
Added number at
hearing level
(Re: ISO)*
Job Mobility
None Some Infinite
25-50 1,017 1,865 8,875
> 50 171 270 1,175
[1/3 (500, 1000,2000 Hz)].
For the more moderate job mobility case, there are still considerably more workers
impaired than in the no job mobility case, although nowhere near so dramatically more as
for infinite job mobility. Clearly, however, the direction of the change appears to be always
toward more hearing impairment with more job mobility.
This same conclusion can be reached in terms of threshold shifts, as given in the EPA/
Air Force figures for any of the data sets examined (Robinson, Baughn, and Passchier-Vermeer).
Tables 2-12 and 2-13, taken from Johnson1* show the threshold shifts expected for different
population percentiles for 85 and 90 dBA. It can be seen that there are very few cases where
the 90/85 ratio of threshold shifts is as much as threefold for corresponding exposure dura
tions and population percentiles. However, in order for job mobility to be neutral in terms
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Table 2-12
Predicted NIPTS for 85 dBA
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1 0 year
09
20 year
d2
40 year
90 .9 2.8 2.5 1.0 4.1 L 3 1.1 5.8 3.9
75 .5 1.8 1.8 .6 2.6 2.. .7 3.8 2.7
50 .1 1.1 1.2 .2 1.6 1.5 .3 2.3 1.9
25 .1 .6 .9 .2 .9 1.3 .3 1.4 1.5
10 0.0 .4 .8 .1 .6 1.0 .2 .8 1.2
90 5.2 5.0 6.5 5.1 7.0 6.1 5.2 9.5 3.7
75 4.0 3.3 4.7 4.0 4.7 5.1 4.1 6.5 3.3
50 2.8 2.0 3.6 2.9 2.9 4.4 3.0 4.2 3.3
25 1.5 1.2 2.7 1.6 1.8 3.7 1.7 2.6 3.5
10 .2 .8 1.9 .3 1.1 2.9 .4 1.6 3.6
90 2.7 4.9 — 3.0 7.0 — 3.4 9.9
75 1.5 3.1 — 1.8 4.6 — 2.2 6.6 —
50 .3 1.9 - .6 2.8 — 1.0 4.0 -
25 .2 1.1 - .5 1.7 — .9 2.4 —
10 .1 .7 - .4 1.0 - .8 1.5 -
90 17.8 11.6 18.6 17.8 15.7 14.5 17.8 20.5 3.2
75 14.4 7.8 13.5 14.4 10.9 13.7 14.4 14.8 5.3
50 11.0 4.9 10.8 11.0 6.9 13.1 11.0 9.8 7.6
25 6.0 2.9 8.0 6.0 4.3 10.8 6.0 6.2 9.7
10 1.0 1.9 5.2 1.0 2.7 8.7 1.0 4.0 10.7
90 10.5 8.4 — 10.5 11.6 _ 10.2 15.7 —
75 9.2 5.5 - 9.2 7.8 - 8.9 10.9 —
50 7.9 3.4 — 7.9 4.9 — 7.6 6.9 —
25 4.1 2.0 — 4.1 2.9 - 3.8 4.3 —
10 .3 1.3 - .3 1.9 - 0.0 2.7 -
00 3.9 — — 3.9 — 3.9 —
75 2.7 — — 2.7 — — 2.5 — —
50 1.5 — — 1.5 — — 1.3 — —
25 1 .5 1.5 — — 1.3 - -
10 1.5 — 1.5 - 1.3 —
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Table 2-13
Predicted NIPTS for 90 dBA
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10 year 20 year 40 year
90 2.4 4.2 5.5 3.2 5.1 6.9 4.5 8.6 7.3
75 1.6 2.4 3.8 2.4 3.1 4.9 3.8 5.4 5.5
50 .8 1.5 2.6 1.6 2.0 3.3 3.1 3.5 3.2
25 .6 1.0 2.0 1.4 1.1 2.6 2.8 2.1 3.0
10 .5 .8 1.8 1.2 .8 2.2 2.5 1.4 2.5
90 7.3 7.8 11.6 8.3 9.8 9.8 9.5 13.8 6.6
75 6.4 5.1 8.5 7.0 6.0 8.5 8.2 9.8 6.1
50 5.1 3.3 6.3 5.7 4.5 7.1 6.9 6.7 5.4
25 3.7 2.1 4.4 4.3 2.8 5.7 5.5 4.3 5.9
10 2.3 1.5 3.3 2.9 1.9 4.7 4.1 2.7 6.2
90 6.8 8.8 9.2 12.2 13.4 16.4 —
75 4.6 5.8 — 7.0 8.3 — 11.2 11.5 —
50 2.4 3.6 — 4.8 5.2 — 9.0 7.4 —
25 1.6 2.1 — 4.0 3.1 — 8.2 4.6 —
10 .8 1.4 - 3.2 2.0 - 7.4 2.9 -
90 23.6 18.8 30.1 23.6 24.0 18.7 23.6 29.5 4.6
75 20.8 13.4 22.7 20.8 17.8 19.2 21.3 22.9 7.8
50 18.0 8.7 17.4 18.0 12.1 18.6 18.5 16.3 10.4
25 13.2 5.5 11.5 .13.2 7.8 14.9 13.7 10.9 14.8
10 8.4 3.5 7.7 8.4 5.1 12.4 8.4 7.3 17.4
90 18.3 14.2 18.3 18.8 18.3 24.0 —
75 15.6 9.8 — 15.6 13.4 — 15.6 17.8 —
50 12.9 6.2 — 12.9 8.7 — 12.9 12.0 —
25 6.7 3.8 — 6.7 5.5 — 6.7 7.8 —
10 .5 2.4 - .5 3.5 - .5 5.1 -
90 8.9 8.9 — 8.9 — —
75 6.7 — — 6.7 — — 6.5 — —
50 4.5 — — 4.5 - — 4.5 — —
25 4.5 — — 4.5 - — 4.5 - —
10 4.5 - - 4.5 - - 4.5 - -
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of total threshold shift produced in the population, these ratios would have to be at least
threefold.* Furthermore, the apparent damage caused by job mobility is even more substan
tial at higher frequencies (e.g., 4 kHz) than it is in the speech frequencies (.5, 1,2 kHz) con
sidered in our risk calculations. Administrative controls that distribute noise exposure more
evenly among workers, without altering total exposures, have similar effects on total
impairment .
Ultimate (40 Year) Effects of Different Regulations
The 100 dBA regulation prevents very little of the hearing impairment, except for the
infinite job mobility case, where it appears to reduce the numbers of people by not quite
half. The 90 dBA regulation reduces the numbers of people crossing the relatively severe
(50 dB) fence by about half, and makes more modest reductions in the numbers crossing
the 25 dB fence at no or some job mobility. The 85 dBA regulation prevents about two-
thirds of the people from crossing the 50 dB fence, and prevents at least a solid majority of
the problem as measured by the lower fence, always bearing in mind that the problem is
defined as the total number of people crossing these thresholds due to present noise expo
sures (in excess of those crossing the thresholds from presbycusis alone).
Effects After 10 Years
It can be seen from the summary table (Table 2-1 1) that in most cases about 30 to 50
percent of the ultimate reductions in hearing impairment will be attained by the end of the
first decade after effective compliance. It should be noted in passing that the time of effec
tive compliance, of course, may be several years removed from the time of promulgation of
the regulation, and will depend heavily on future staffing levels of OSHA area offices and the
general diligence with which enforcement is carried out.
*This is not an ultimately rigorous comparison due to the fact that an increased
population at the lower exposure level would be spread over a broader range of population
percentiles, but believe the resulting error is on the side of minimizing the apparent damage
of job mobility.
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NONAUDITORY EFFECTS
Before discussing the nonauditory effects of noise, it is important to be clear about the
standard of proof or certainty applied in judging the scientific evidence. The existence of
noise-induced hearing loss at exposure levels below the 90 dBA standard must really be
regarded as established beyond a reasonable doubt, although there is some room for respon
sible dispute about the magnitude of the effect. However, when nonauditory effects of
noise are examined, it is apparent that although there is a substantial body of data that sug
gests a wide variety of noise-induced health effects of potentially great significance in
social terms, the scientific evidence for most or all of the effects is far from conclusive for
exposures of 85 or 90 dBA for 8 hours. This being the case, can and should effects with this
degree of uncertainty form part of the basis for a social policy choice by OSHA? They
should, for the following reason: to ignore uncertain effects essentially assigns a value of
zero to them, if one is thinking in cost-benefit terms. However, if there is any appreciable
probability that the effects occur, then society is taking an extra chance of incurring addi
tional harm if the less protective standard is adopted. It is not, in general, reasonable to
assume that avoiding this possibility is of zero value to society. Indeed, in many areas of
current social policy-making (such as, for example, nuclear power plant safety) very unlikely
events of potentially great harm are considered quite important in the determination of policy.
Biological Effects
Cardiovascular and Endocrine Effects
The major concern over nonauditory health effects from noise arises from the ability
of noise under some circumstances to act as a general, nonspecific biological stressor. Other
than hearing loss, noise is not suspected of producing any single health problem unique to
itself and comparable to the vinyl chloride angiosarcomas, the thalidomide birth defects, or
the asbestos mesotheliomas. Rather the effects of noise, if any, are likely to be distributed
over a large number of common individual cardiovascular and other maladies whose causation
is complex and attributable to other factors as well. Nonetheless, because, in particular,
cardiovascular diseases are such a massive problem in our society, even if noise were to increase
their frequency or severity by a small percentage in the exposed population, this would be a
very substantial adverse impact. Major cardiovascular diseases* account for well over half of
all deaths in the United States, currently somewhat over a million people per year. 7 They
are also, by far, the most frequent cause of permanent total disability in those under 65, as
measured by Social Security awards. 8
*Heart attack, stroke, etc.
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Figure 2-4 indicates some of the broad mechanisms by which noise may possibly be
contributing to cardiovascular pathology. It must be emphasized that this schema is not
presented as established. In no case has any single study documented the entire series of
events indicated in any of the separate damage pathways in any particular worker popula
tion. Figure 2-4 represents a coherent set of hypotheses which can be used to look at the
diverse available data, and make a tentative judgment of the overall plausibility of the
indicated relationships between noise and cardiovascular disease. Table 2-14 following the
figure gives synopses of the papers (positive and negative) felt to be the most important to
consider in making this judgment.
The concept of biological stress, first proposed by Selye, has been described^ as
the non-specific response of the body to any demand made upon it; a stereo
typed, phylogenetically old adaptation pattern primarily preparing the organism
for physical activity, e.g., fight or flight.
It is conceivable that in the dawn of the history of mankind, noise very often
was a signal of danger or else of a situation requiring muscular activity. In
order to survive, the human organism had to prepare itself for activity, inter
alia by the non-specific adaptation pattern defined as stress. More often than
not, noise in today's industrialized societies has a meaning very different from
what it had during the stone age. Yet, according to one hypothesis, our
genetically determined psychobiological programming still makes one react as
if muscular activity would be an adequate reaction to any sudden, unexpected
or annoying noise stimulus.
The stress reaction consists of a wide variety of viological changes, many of which are likely
to be mediated by increased adrenal secretion of the catecholamine hormones, epinephrine
and norepinephrine (also called adrenaline and noradrenaline). In judging the plausibility of
the damage pathway in Figure 2-4 which starts with the arrow from "A" to "B," two ques
tions are of paramount importance:
1) To what degree do industrial workers respond to noise on the job by chronic or
repeated biological stress reactions (manifested by chronic or repeated increases in
catecholamine levels)?
2) To what degree do such reactions inflict a biological price in the form of either
a) small incremental additions to a chronic pathological process such as
atherosclerosis (hardening of the arteries) or
b) precipitation of overt incidents of major damage (such as a heart attack, or
stroke) in otherwise asymptomatic but physiologically borderline individuals?
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NOISE
GeneralStressReaction
(e.g..Elevatedadrenaline
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Figure 2-4. Possible pathways of cardiovascular damage from noise
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Both of the types of damage indicated in items 2(a) and 2(b) above could be produced if
noise stress were to increase the adhesiveness of platelets ("F" in Figure 2-4) on a chronic or
repeated basis. Increased platelet adhesiveness has been observed in response to several dif
ferent stressors,20,21 including noise ^ and the effect can also be produced in response to
the artificial infusion of norepinephrine from outside the organism. 16,23 increased platelet
adhesiveness makes sense as part of the general "fight or flight" preparation of the body
because it would produce more rapid clotting of blood in the event of a wound. However,
this increased platelet adhesiveness has clear potential for negative side effects due to an
increased tendency for the formation of thrombi* at places of minor damage in arteries in
the heart and elsewhere.20,21 There is strong evidence that such thrombi contribute to the
buildup of atherosclerotic "plaques" which gradually narrow arteries and chronically reduce
the oxygen supply of vital tissues.-^ >5' The same thrombi may also contribute on an acute
basis to the completion of the pathological sequence by forming the final occlusion of an
aheady-narro wed artery leading to tissue death. Exogenously infused norepinephrine has
been observed to produce necrosis (death) of cardiac muscle, and this necrosis can be greatly
reduced by the simultaneous administration of various inhibitors of platelet adhesiveness.^,
The likelihood that this mechanism plays a significant role in real cardiac pathology in the
population is increased by three additional observations:
• Heart attack patients in general, and some subcategories of patients in particular,
appear to be composed of individuals who secrete abnormally large amounts of
catecholamine hormones.^4
• Patients with ischemic heart disease appear to have generally higher coagulant
activity in platelet-rich fractions of their plasma than normal controls. 34
• Some epidemiological studies suggest a role for some kinds of emotional/occupa
tional stress in heart disease. 31—33
The other major route of damage shown in Figure 2-4, that through increased blood
pressure must be regarded with considerable caution. As can be seen from Table 2-14 the
evidence is, for the most part, quite equivocal. Some epidemiological observations seem to
be suggestive, but all available studies leave a great deal to be desired. At this time, there
can be no firm basis for ruling this category of effect either in or out.
In summary, one might say that although a great deal more scientific work will be
needed before it can be said that workplace noise definitely contributes to cardiovascular
disease, a relationship between the two is entirely plausible.
*Thrombi are small aggregates of platelets and other blood components involved in
clotting.
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Immunological Effects
Related to the action of noise as a stressor, various effects on the immune system are
to be expected and have been observed. Various stressors^ including intense noise^ induce
a biphasic secretion of corticosteroids known to depress some kinds of immunological acti
vity. Jensen and Rasmussen^O monitored peripheral white blood cell levels in mice in
response to 3-hour exposures to 123 dB of an 800 Hz tone. During the noise there was
a pronounced drop in white blood cell count, followed by an equally pronounced rise for
several hours immediately following exposure. In a companion paper^l Jensen and Rasmussen
innoculated mice with vesicular stomatitis virus immediately before or immediately after the
exposure. As one might expect from the white blood cell response it was found that the
mice innoculated before exposure were appreciably more sensitive, and mice innoculated
after were less sensitive to infection than control mice.
The significance of potential shifts in immunological capabilities is large, as the immune
system is of course our major bulwark against all manner of infectious diseases that exact a
large toll of sickness and restricted activity every year. Available information is far from
adequate to assess the likely magnitude of any noise-induced immunological effects, but
data of Cohen to be published shortly are said to suggest that absenteeism from many dis
parate causes is increased in noise-exposed workers. If true, this could be of substantial
economic and human importance.
Fetal Abnormalities
Finally under the category of possible biological effects, we feel compelled to mention
a recent, surprisingly strong set of experiments reported by Geber.62 The standard cautions
with respect to all data of this type are in order — it is impossible to predict the likelihood
and the degree that results of teratogenicity experiments in rodents will be manifested in
humans, and it must be emphasized that the exposure conditions in these experiments were
radically different than workplace noise.* The fact that a continually changing noise exposure,
kept up day and night, is likely to be appreciably more stressful than most exposures which
*Quoting from the Geber paper, "A wide variety of electric horns, gongs, and alarm
bells was mounted throughout the interior of the stress chamber along with six 10-inch
speakers to send the outputs of an Fico Model 377 audio generator and "white noise" from
a Grason-Stadler noise generator into the stress chamber. The characteristics of the noise
stress were such that the measured decibel range of the noise spectrum within the stress
chamber was 74-94 dB and the frequency range was from 20 to 25.000 cycles/sec. All units
of the noise-generating apparatus were connected to individual cycling timers set to deliver
effective daily noise stimulation of the pregnant animals equal to 10 percent (6 mm.) of each
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might be expected in industry cannot be ignored. Nevertheless, the absolute levels of noise
used were not excessive, and the results in terms of inhibition, partial, or complete absence
of calcification of fetal bones are unequivocal (Table 2-15).
Table 2-15*
Effects of noise stress on ossification of bones in fetal rats
Number of fetal rats with various degrees of skeletal ossification
Degree of fetal
ossification Control Noise Total
Younger pregnant
females:
Complete absence 0 52 52
Partial absence 2 60 62
General inhibition 2 60 62
Normal 749 310 1,059
Total 753 482 1,235
Older pregnant
females:
Complete absence 2 37 39
Partial absence 4 67 71
General inhibition 0 98 98
Normal 331 68 399
Total 331 270 607
♦Adapted from Geber, W. F. (56)
hour of the day with relative quiet, i.e., ambient noise, existing throughout the remaining
90 percent (54 min.) of each hour. Schedules of sequencing of the noises were randomly
controlled by variation in cycling times of the various timers. Thus, the degree of acclimation
to each noise pattern was presumed to be minimal since it was continually changing in
reference to all others.
The noise stress was continued throughout each day of the entire pregnancy or until
some other day was attained, i.e., 16-22 days."
2A2
While it cannot be concluded from these experiments that maternal exposures to
industrial noise are definitely dangerous to the fetus, the findings certainly cast some doubt
on their safety. The question of possible teratogenic effects from exposures to noxious
agents of all kinds in the workplace environment has unfortunately received almost no
scientific study to this date. The most serious investigations we know of are the recent
findings in nurses exposed to anaesthetic gases. With women rapidly acquiring more equal
access to employment in heavy industrial jobs, it is imperative that consideration of all
workplace standards should include the realization that women in the early stages of
pregnancy* will be exposed along with males. Even a small increased risk of birth defects
must, of course, be counted as a substantial adverse impact on society.
Workplace Effects
Perceived A nnoyance
There has been a great deal of research into the "loudness," "perceived noisiness" and
"annoyance" qualities of different types of noise. An excellent recent review of the subject
is contained in a recent paper by Miller.63 A weakness of most of the data for purposes of
the current regulatory activity is that, for the most part, measurements seem to have been
made in either a laboratory or a community-noise setting. We have not located work on the
direct measurement of parameters related to annoyance in an industrial context. Psycho
logical characteristics of individuals, and general attitudes of workers toward their employer
and their work will undoubtedly have a bearing on the magnitude of the annoyance felt in
response to the noise on a particular job. However, it seems reasonable to expect on the
basis of existing research that at least five physical parameters of noise will have approxi
mately the following relative influence of noise on perceived annoyance:
The five physical factors mentioned by Kryter operate approximately as
follows: (1 ) Intensity and frequency content - noisiness increases with sound
level approximately as does loudness, that is a 10-dB increase in the level of
moderately intense sounds results in a doubling of judged noisiness. Sounds
with energy concentrations between 2000 Hz and 8000 Hz are judged to be
more noisy than sounds of equal sound pressure level outside this range. This
effect can be equivalent to a 10-20 dB increase in level or a factor of 2-4 in
judged noisiness. (2) A concentration of energy or spectrum complexity — this
may have an effect which increases the noisiness by 2-3 times or the equivalent
*Nearly all fetal anomalies are produced by events in the first three months after
conception.
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of 10-15 dB over that noisiness that would be otherwise predicted. (3) Duration
the noisiness of a sound increases with its duration. The relation is logarithmic,
and over a range from a few seconds to a few minutes, an increase in duration by
a factor of ten results in a change that is roughly equal to a 10-dB increase in
level, in other words, an increase in noisiness by a factor of two. Detailed study
indicates that the growth of noisiness with duration is more rapid in the range of
\A sec and less rapid beyond 15 sec than predicted by a single logarithmic rela
tion. (4) Duration of the period of rising sound pressure level - sounds that are
increasing in level are judged to be of greater noisiness than those decreasing in
level. A sound that takes 10 sec to reach a maximum level may be judged more
noisy than one of equal energy that reaches its maximum level in 3 sec. This dif
ference can be the equivalent of about 3 dB or a factor of 1 .2 in noisiness.
(5) Sudden increases in level — in contrast, impulsive sounds that reach a high
peak very abruptly, i.e., in a fraction of a second, may be judged to be very noisy.
While this effect depends on the magnitude of the impulse, it can be very large.
People judge impulsive sounds to be very noisy even when these sounds are
familiar and expected. 63
Of these five parameters, only the first, intensity, is affected in a reasonably predictable wa\
by the proposed industrial noise regulations. Later we will use the fact that perceived noisi
ness increases by approximately a factor of 2 for each 10 dB increase in level in rough calcu
lations of the approximate value of annoyance reductions produced by the proposed standai
Effects on Work Performance
The area of work performance is perhaps the most difficult to assess in a satisfactory
way for purposes of social decision-making. At least with the other effects of noise one can
be reasonably confident that, to the extent they occur, the direction of change will be for
the worse for the human organism. EPA's criteria documental succinctly summarizes a
daunting volume of available experimental work as follows:
Viewed as a whole, the literature on noise and performance shows that some
times noise interferes with performance, sometimes it improves it, and usually
it causes no significant changes. A number of general conclusions, however,
have emerged :
1 . Steady noises without special meaning do not seem to interfere with
human performance unless the noise level exceeds about 90 dBA and
not consistently even then. 64
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2. Intermittent and impulsive noises are more disruptive than steady-state
noises.65 Even when the sound levels of irregular bursts are below 90
dBA they may sometimes interfere with performance of a task.66
3. High-frequency components of noise (above about 2000 Hz) usually
produce more interference with performance than low-frequency com
ponents of noise.
4. Noise usually does not influence the overall rate of work, but high
levels of noise may increase the variability of the work rate. There may
be "noise pauses" or gaps in response,67 sometimes followed by compen
sating increases in work rate.
5. Noise is more likely to reduce the accuracy of work than to reduce the
total quantity of work. 67,68
6. Complex or demanding tasks are more likely to be adversely influenced
by noise than simple tasks. 69
Our own brief review of the literature has uncovered little relevant to these proceedings
that would either add or subtract materially from the EPA conclusions, with the possible
exception of a recent study by Hartley. 70 Hartley's study is interesting in that he measured
performance on a serial reaction test* in noise and in quiet** with and without ear defenders.
The results, in terms of average "gaps" and "errors" are reproduced below:
*The test is performed with a subject seated before a display consisting of 5 neon
light sources arranged in a pentagon, one of which is always illuminated. Arranged on a
horizontal response board are 5 brass disks corresponding to the light sources. The (subject)
is required to tape the disk appropriate to the lamp illuminated. The light promptly extin-
quishes and another is lit. The (subject) works as quickly and accurately as possible, scoring
as many corrects and as few errors as possible. The third score consists of pauses or gaps of
1-1 12 sec between tapping one disk and tapping the next. The (subjects) were 16 housewives
and professional men, ranging 18-45 years of age.
**Broad-band noise having equal energy per octave was used throughout. In the N
conditions it was presented at 95 dB, and in the Q conditions, at 70 dB, measured on the C
scale.
***The ear protection was provided by Amplivox Sonogard ear defenders, specified as
providing a substantially linear attenuation with frequency over the audible range (20 dB at
200 Hz, 30 dB at 500 Hz, 38 dB at 1 and 2 kHz, and 45 dB at 4 kHz, measured at one-fifth
octave bands and the American Standard Method for the Measurement of the Real Ear
Attenuation of Ear Protection at Threshold, ASAZ-24.22-1957).
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Mean Gaps in Each 10-Min. Block Under Each Condition
Condition Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Total
Q 2.57 5.13 6.69 7.31 21.70
Q + ED 4.07 6.57 8.25 7.50 26.39
N 5.06 11.12 10.44 8.94 35.56
N + ED 3.57 6.50 9.81 9.88 29.76
Note. Abbreviations: Q = quiet, N = noise, and ED = ear defenders.
Mean Errors in Each 10-Min. Block Under Each Condition
Condition Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4 Total
Q 2.10 4.67 6.11 5.72 18.60
Q + ED 3.30 5.22 8.80 6.25 23.57
N 2.87 6.10 8.10 5.19 22.26
N + ED 3.45 9.90 9.73 7.97 31.05
Note. Abbreviations: Q = quiet, N = noise, and ED = ear defenders.
By the "gaps" measure of performance (number of pauses of 1-1/2 seconds) the ear defenders
appear to be somewhat helpful in noise, but fall far short of producing performance com
parable to that produced by the quiet condition. Ear defenders used in the quiet seem to
increase gaps on their own, to some degree. By the errors measure of performance, neither
noise nor ear defenders individually produced large enough effects to be statistically signifi
cant, but it would appear that, when combined, they produced a rather substantial increase
in average errors.* These suggested effects invite considerable further study, but for purposes
of the current rule making they tend to give added support to the preference of OSHA,
NIOSH, and EPA for engineering solutions to noise, rather than personal ear protection. The
widely-observed resistance of workers to the discomfort and annoyance of at least some ear
protectors increases the probability that their imposition may sometimes have negative effects
on the quality, if not the quantity, of industrially-produced goods.
No quantitative guess is in order on the magnitude of these effects, partly because of the
lack of fundamental baseline data. (Few companies, for example, publish yearly figures on
the average number and type of defects in their products.) It is not impossible, however, that
over a number of years economic performance losses of the same order of magnitude as engi
neering control costs could be presented by engineering compliance with noise regulations.
*It should be noted that the author of this paper himself inexplicably but studiously
avoids drawing this latter conclusion.
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Effects on absenteeism, accident and injury rates
Effects of workplace noise on absenteeism, accident, and injury rates have long been
postulated as likely end results of other properties of noise (both biological and psycho
social) which are easier to measure directly. It is not at all unreasonable to suppose that an
increased tendency toward absenteeism might result both from workers' psychological aver
sion to returning each day to an unpleasant environment, and from any general lowering of
immunological resistance to infection. Moreover, the frequency and severity of industrial
injuries could easily tend to be higher in noisy environments both as a result of possible
masking of warning signals and because of an increase in momentary gaps or errors in
performance.
Plausible as these effects are, they have to date posed truly formidable problems for
epidemiological demonstration. The basic reason why the epidemiology is so difficult is tha
it is hard to imagine a situation where one might find reasonably comparable worker popula
tions in reasonably comparable jobs exposed to reasonably comparable accident and health
hazards, at substantially different, well characterizable noise exposure levels, all with either
excellent records of accidents, illnesses, and absenteeism or the capability of producing such
records over an extended period of time while keeping all the other conditions constant.
This epidemiological problem is considerably more challenging than most other epidemio
logical problems because of the intimate association between noise exposure and other
characteristics of the population and the jobs (such as, socioeconomic status, exposure to
safety hazards of particular types from specific types of machinery, etc.) which would tend
to confuse the results unless the experiment were very carefully controlled. One must admin
the professional fortitude of anyone undertaking such a study.
This being the case, it is remarkable that eyen one serious attempt at an epidemiological
investigation meeting the criteria outlined above has been performed. Such a study, the
second part of the Raytheon study performed in cooperation with NIOSH, compared acci
dent, illness and absentee rates for different worker groups in a large manufacturing plant
before and after the institution of a hearing conservation program. The study is still in the
process of final publication and is unfortunately unavailable for full review here. However,
the conclusions of the authors are reported to be that they did observe quote suggestively
higher incidences of absenteeism, illnesses, and accidents when the workers had greater effec
tive exposures to noise.
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BENEFITS AND COSTS OF A MORE PROTECTIVE STANDARD
An attempt will be made to construct an elementary balance sheet indicating the
important benefits as well as costs of effective 85 dBA and 90 dBA regulations for different
sectors of our society. In all cases, these impacts will be based on a comparison with a
theoretical baseline case of noise exposures unchanged from present levels. Two time periods
will be examined; the first from effective compliance to 10 years after effective compliance,
and the second from effective compliance to 40 years after effective compliance.
Hearing Conservation
Tables 2-10 and 2-1 1 quantified the numbers of excess* people in two hearing level
ranges given different noise standards and different assumptions about job mobility in the
population at the two different time periods after effective compliance. To determine the
hearing conservation benefits of each regulation, subtracting the number of people in each
hearing level range under the regulation from the corresponding number of people who
would experience impaired hearing in the same range under the baseline case. The results
of this procedure at the time points of 10 and 40 years after compliance are shown in
Table 2-1 6, with the best estimates corresponding to the some job mobility case (where a
worker is assumed to hold three jobs in his lifetime, one of which may be noisy and two of
which are at 80 dBA), and the extreme values of the ranges corresponding to the highest and
lowest values of the three job mobility cases.**
At this stage, two points from the computation of these results should be reiterated:
• Only people in the workforce and between the ages of 20 and 64 are included in
these data. In particular, some number of additional people experiencing poorer
hearing than they otherwise would after the age of 65 can be expected to exist.
• The people placed in the over 50 dB hearing level range by the influence of noise
for the most part would have had hearing in the 25-50 dB category in the absence
of noise - their hearing has gone to a severely impaired state from an already
*In "excess" of those who would have been at the stated hearing levels in the absence
of noise exposure (i.e., due to presbycusis, etc.).
**From data presented by Dr. Ward in his testimony, it is our general impression that
the "some" job mobility case is, if anything, a conservative estimate of the actual job
mobility likely in noisy jobs in the industrial population.
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Table 2-16
Reductions* in the Numbers of People with Different Degrees of
Hearing Impairment after Compliance with
Different Noise Regulations
At 10 years after compliance
(Thousands of people)
At 40 years after compliance
Hearing level
range
Range of estimates
over spectrum of
no-infinite job
mobility assumptions
Range of estimates
over spectrum of
no-infinite job
mobility assumptions
Best**
estimate
Best
estimate
90 dBA regulation:
<>>
Hearing level
range:***
25-50 dB 448 (191 -2,344) 1,025 (427 -9,814)
Over 50 dB 81 ( 40- 81) 208 (118- 980)
85 dBA regulation:
25-50 dB 767 (412-3,159) 1,760 (791 - 1 1,039)
Over 50 dB 114 ( 51 - 114) 286 (150- 1,117)
Added benefit of
85 dBA, over
90 dBA:
25-50 dB 319 (221- 815) 735 (364- 1,225)
Over 50 dB 33 ( 0- 33)**** 78 ( 32 - 137)
*A11 numbers represent reductions in numbers of hearing impaired people from the
baseline case of-no change in worker noise exposures.
**Calculated under "some" job mobility assumption (3 jobs per worker).
***Average at 0.5, 1,2 kHz, Re: ISO.
****"0" value at bottom of this range is, in part, an artifact of the calculation procedure.
Some.small finite value is to be expected, even in the job mobility case which gives the "0"
estimate.
2^9
slightly to moderately impaired state.* Numbers shown in the 25-50 dB category
reflect the net effects of entrance from the group that would otherwise be under
25 dB and the exit of individuals from the 25-50 dB group to the group over
50 dB.
Table 2-1 6 has given the number of people affected at two points in time. To under
stand the total impact of the regulations through the intervening years, one should ideally
1) divide time into individual small units (years, or months),
2) multiply the number of people affected times the individual small durations, and
3) add the results together to find the number of person-years of impairment pre
vented by each regulation over specified periods in the future.
As an approximation to this ideal procedure, it has simply been assumed that the numbers
of people affected between 0-10 years and 10-40 years after compliance follows straight lines
between the 0, 10 and 40 year points under each of the different job mobility cases. Using
this latter procedure, for example, the benefit of each regulation over the first 10 years was
taken as simply five times the benefit which was indicated to occur in the tenth year.**
Table 2-1 7 shows the final results - total millions of person-years at each hearing level saved
by each regulation during the first 10 and 40 years after compliance. These millions of
person-years of impairment cannot be adequately translated into economic costs, but they
may be compared to the economic costs in arriving at the final noise regulation. They will
be entered, together with the other costs and benefits, on the final balance sheet. Tables
2-16 and 2-17 are condensed in summary Table 2-18.
Workers' Compensation Costs Saved
It has long been recognized that occupational disease is under-reported in both employers'
injury and disease logs and in workers' compensation claims. A recent NIOSH-sponsored
study at the University of Washington indicates that occupational disease is under-reported in
employers' logs by a factor of 50 and in workers' compensation by a factor of 33.72
*A discussion of the significance to the affected individuals of the various hearing levels
was presented in section 2.
**ln other words, the average yearly benefit over the first 10 years was simply taken as
half of the benefit for the tenth year.
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Table 2-17
Person-years of hearing impairment prevented by
different noise regulations during
different periods after compliance
Hearing level
During first 10 years
after compliance
Millions of person-years**
During first 40 years
after compliance
range Range of estimates
over spectrum of
no-infinite job
mobility
Range of estimates
over spectrum of
no-infinite job
mobility
Best
estimate
Best
estimate
90 dBA regulation:
Hearing level
range:*
25-50 dB 2.2 (1.0 -12 ) 11 (4.5 -120 )
Over 50 dB 0.41 ( .20- .41) 2.3 (1.4 - 14 )
85 dBA regulation:
25-50 dB 3.8 (2.1 -16 ) 19 (7.7 -130 )
Over 50 dB .57 ( .26- .57) 3.2 (1.7 - 16 )
Added benefit of
85 dBA,
over 90 dBA:
25-50 dB 1.6 (1.1 - 4.1 ) 8.4 (3.3 - 10 )
Over 50 dB .17 (0 - .17) .84 ( .37- 2.1)
*Average at 0.5, 1 , 2 kHz Re: ISO.
**Numbers may not always add because of rounding.
Traditionally, the number and size of annual worker's compensation claims have been
small as compared to other types of disability payments. However, with an increased aware
ness on the part of employees to health hazards on the job, the number of compensated
hearing loss cases is on the increase. The data in at least one state, California, indicates a
five-fold increase in the number of hearing loss cases in the 14-year period, 1955-1 968
(Table 2-19).
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Table 2-18
Summary of best estimates of added benefits of
85 dBA over 90 dBA regulation
Hearing level 10 Years
after compliance
40 Years
after compliance
Thousands of people
with reduced hearing
impairment :
25-50 dB 319 735
Over 50 dB 33 78
Millions of person-years
of impairment prevented:
25-50 dB 1.6 8.4
Over 50 dB .17 .84
Table 2-19
Number of hearing loss cases, fiscal years 1955 to 1968
Fiscal year ended
June 30
Northern
area
Southern
area
Total
1955 86 39 47
1956 100 35 65
1957 93 41 52
1958 144 52 92
1959 186 58 128
1960 143 48 95
1961 148 46 102
1962 332 66 266
1963 373 72 301
1964 289 81 208
1965 296 94 202
1966 300 91 209
1967 369 104 265
1968 421 159 262
Compiled by the Division of Labor Statistics and Research,
Department of Industrial Relations, State of California, March 1969.
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Because of the trend toward a greater number of compensation claims and because of
the need for cost calculations which includes the potential loss to the society through the
worker's compensation system, we have based our estimates on previously described hearing
loss which assumes a total capture (i.e., a total claiming) of this economic factor. This is
based on no change in present compensation schedules, a fact which may offset to some
degree the inevitable fact that not all workers who will be handicapped for compensation
purposes will receive payment.
It has already been mentioned that the workers' compensation claims are a one-time
cost, even if in reality the claims may be spaced over a variety of different times. For the
purpose of our calculations we have decided to examine the potential benefits (compensation
costs saved) both 10 and 40 years hence.
The magnitude of this potential benefit is to be found in Table 2-20 under the conditions
of compliance with 90 dBA and 85 dBA. Four conclusions are worth noting:
• the assumption of job mobility greatly increases the estimate of benefit to be
derived,
• about a third of the benefit is captured in the first 10 years,
• both those suffering moderate harm and severe harm are benefitted significantly,
and
• a change in compliance from 90 dBA to 85 dBA brings considerable marginal
returns - approximately twice the benefit in cases of less severe hearing loss.
Social Costs of Absenteeism and Other Effects
Given the discussions on the state of knowledge of performance, absenteeism, general
illness, and industrial injury effects of noise, it must be appreciated that any assessment of
the social costs of these effects must be highly speculative. Nonetheless, the effects are all
generally plausible, and the expected value of their impact on society, though highly uncer
tain, is clearly not zero. The average employed worker loses about 5 to 6 days per year from
all illnesses and injuries.^ 3 Due to the limitations of sample size and other sources of varia
bility in epidemiological techniques, it is difficult to imagine that the current NIOSH study
could reveal statistically significant noise-related increases in absenteeism if the effects on
total absenteeism attributable to noise were less than about 2 to 3 days per worker - that is,
about 50 percent over the normal "background" level. Considering this, and considering the
likelihood of performance and industrial injury effects, it is not unreasonable to suppose that
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Table 2-20
Potential workers' compensation payments for hearing loss in both ears
($ millions, not discounted)
40 years after compliance
90dBA 85 dBA
1 job
per
worker
3 jobs
per
worker
1 job
per
worker
3 jobs
per
worker
Workers handicapped 15% at 35 dB* $ 705 $1,691 $1,305 $2,904
Workers handicapped 52% at 60 dB* $ 675 $1,190 $ 858 $1,636
Total payments $1,380 $2,881 $2,163 $4,540
10 years after compliance
90dBA 85 dBA
1 job
per
worker
3 jobs 1 job
per
worker
3 jobs
per
worker
per
worker
Workers handicapped 15% at 35 dB $ 315 $ 739 $ 680 $1,266
Workers handicapped 52% at 60 dB $ 229 $ 463 $ 292 $ 652
Total payments $ 544 $1,202 $ 972 $1,918
""'Handicap" for compensation calculations is 1-1 /2 percent for each dB loss between
average hearing levels of 26 dB and 92 dB. Based on 10 State average maximum payment of
$1 1 ,000, 15 percent handicap equals $1 ,650/worker and 52 percent handicap equals $5,720/
worker.
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the approximate order of magnitude of the total economic harm caused by all of these effects
may be the equivalent of about one day of work less per worker per year for all those esti
mated by BBN to be exposed to more than 85 dBA.
The Frye report (1965)74 estimated that reducing absenteeism by 1 day per year over
the total workforce of 80 million would add about $10 billion to the gross national product,
or about $1 25 per worker/day. Today because of inflation and the real growth in our GNP
the number would be about twice as high, or $250 per worker-day. If the guess outlined in
the previous paragraph of 1 day's effective absenteeism per year per worker exposed over
85 dBA is accepted, then the approximate total benefit to workers in industries examined by
BBN from this source potentially realizable from noise control amounts to $250 x 8 million =
$2 billion. Over 10 and 40-year periods after compliance, the potential benefit would, of
course be correspondingly multiplied.
It must be reemphasized, of course, that like compliance cost estimates, these estimates
are unfortunately only best guesses, though reasonable ones. Reasonable people should
agree that such potential benefits should be considered in an even handed appraisal of proposed
social policy.
Annoyance as a Social Cost
That noise is, to some degree, a net overall annoyance to industrial workers must be
considered reasonably beyond dispute. By and large, it must be supposed that workers
exposed to industrial noise in the range under discussion consider it, on balance, unpleasant
or annoying. This depression of their quality of life is clearly a social cost. To the degree
that workplace noise regulations may reduce this social cost, the reductions should enter into
an assessment of the overall costs and benefits of these social policies. Offered in this section
are some quantifications, albeit highly uncertain and tentative quantifications, of the approxi
mate magnitude of these effects in relation to the estimated economic costs of compliance.
Before entering these computations, however, it should clarify some points about the
operation of market forces with respect to annoyance costs.
• In contrast with some of the long-range auditory and health effects of noise,
annoyance effects are relatively easy for individuals to judge and integrate into
decisions about whether or not to accept a particular job. It therefore may be
contended by some that, in general, in a free market, the worker's wage will
include some additional monetary inducement to take a noisy job, over a quiet
one. However, it should be noted that this kind of mechanism, to the extdnt it
operates effectively in practice, merely causes a partial redistribution of the
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social cost of noise annoyance from workers to their employers (the employers,
of course, have to pay the premium that the workers get). There is no net decline
in the total annoyance cost born by the society as a whole by this mechanism.
• A market factor which would tend to reduce overall annoyance costs is worker
self-selection for noise annoyance resistance in noisy jobs. It can be expected that
those workers who are more annoyed than average would tend to end up in
quieter jobs and those workers who are less annoyed than average would tend to
end up in noisier jobs, other things being equal. Therefore in considering the value
to be assigned to workplace noise annoyance, we must, to the extent possible,
attempt to reflect the values of the individuals actually in those jobs, rather than
the average values of the general population.
The discussion of past research on perceived annoyance revealed one reasonably solid
relationship that can contribute to the calculations; for each 10 dBA increase in intensity of
a particular noise, the perceived noisiness approximately doubles. In addition to this relation
ship, the only additional inputs needed are the distribution of noise exposures and the actual
average annoyance value of some standard noise exposure over some unit of time. The
exposure distributions were discussed in some detail in the hearing impairment section,
leaving the annoyance value of a standard noise exposure the only remaining unquantified
parameter. For this, one is forced to speculate, but believe that it is possible to specify a
reasonable range of values, using dollars as a yardstick, which probably contains the true
average value.
Selected as the standard exposure is an average 90 dBA continuous noise for an 8-hour
day. How much per hour do we believe an average worker in such a job might be willing to
sacrifice to do the same work in quiet (say, 50 dBA) conditions? It is suggested that at an
absolute minimum, this difference should be considered to be worth 10 cents an hour. For
purposes of calculation, this is taken as a lower bound. As an upper bound, it is suggested
that it is probably unlikely that the average worker would spend more than about 50 cents
an hour, simply on an annoyance basis* to accomplish the reduction from 90 to 50 dBA.
(The reader may, of course, choose others for calculation purposes, if he or she disagrees with
these values.) Now if one can accept the 10-50 cents/hour range as the approximate value of
an average daily 90 dBA exposure, the values of average exposures at other levels can be
estimated by doubling or halving these values for each 10 dBA departure from 90 dBA, using
the formula
Value at X dBA = (value at 90 dBA) 2 (X
" 90>/10
*Excluding any health or hearing impairment considerations.
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The following table summarizes the results of these calculations:
Table 2-21
Range of annoyance values
dollars/hour
Exposure level
80 0.05-0.25
85 0.07-0.35
90 0.10-0.50
95 0.14-0.71
100 0.20 - 1.00
105 0.28 - 1.41
110 0.40 - 2.00
115 0.57-2.83
From these and other intermediate values, combined with the exposure distributions given in
the hearing impairment section, Table 2-22 shows the computation of the range of total
annoyance costs per year - at present, and after compliance with 85 dBA or 90 dBA standards.
The values for total annoyance costs under each standard are then subtracted from the
annoyance costs that would be incurred if exposures continued as they are at present. The
range of annoyance costs saved per year, and over the next 10 and 40 years are given in Table
2-23. It should be noted that for this table, presented are undiscounted benefits. However
when summed up in the final balance sheets, the figures will reflect these benefits discounted
at a rate of 7 percent per year. (The discussion of what discount rates to apply in social policy
making is beyond the scope of this presentation. In brief, it is believed that the proper discount
rate should be the long term expectation of the difference between risk-free interest rates and
inflation rates, and that this is probably in the neighborhood of 7 percent.)
Innovation and Regulation
An important economic effect of regulation, especially a regulation so broad as that
concerning workplace noise, is the impact on technological innovation. This is a particularly
significant issue in the current controversy since it is unclear exactly how industry will respond,
technologically, to either an 85 or 90 dBA standard.
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Table 2-22
Computation of annual annoyance costs under different regulations
Present exposures
Thousands Billions
of hours
per year*
Annoyance cost
Exposure
level
of
workers
Low value
$ billions/year
High value
$ billions/year
82 5,858 11.72 0.67 3.3
87 4,769 9.54 .77 3.9
92 1,878 3.16 .43 2.2
97 939 1.88 .30 1.5
102 469 .94 .22 1.1
107 235 .47 .15 .8
112 117 .23 .11 .5
117 117 .23 .15 .8
Total 14,382 28.76 2.81 14.0
After compliance
with 90dBA standard:
82 11.72 .67 3.3
87 9.54 .77 3.9
90 7.51 .75 3.8
Total 28.76 2.19 11.0
After compliance
with 85 dBA standard:
82 11.72 .67 3.3
85 17.05 1.21 6.1
Total 28.76 1.88 9.4
*Assuming 2,000 hours per worker-year
In order to understand the effects of the standard on innovation, one must separate the
noise control industry from other sectors. With full enforcement of either an 85 or 90 dBA
standard, the demand for noise control technology will exceed current sales of this industry,
as BBN has reported. BBN goes on to say, however, that this demand will stimulate increased
investment and new technological developments which may well be able to satisfy these new
req m e in ?nts. The results of other research on innovation strongly support BBN's assertion.
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Table 2-23
Net savings of annoyance costs under
90 dBA and 85 dBA regulations
Billions of dollars
Standards Annual
savings
Savings over
first 10 years
after compliance
Savings over
first 40 years
after compliance
90 dBA standard 0.61 -3.1 3.1 -31 25 - 123
85 dBA standard .93-4.6 9.3-46 37 - 185
Benefits of 85 dBA
over 90 dBA .31 -1.6 3.1 -16 13- 63
""Unadjusted for any social discount rate.
From this work one knows that market factors, such as increased demand, appear to be the
primary influence on innovation. Approximately 10 relatively recent studies have shown this
to be true, as reported in work published by other MIT personnel from the Center for Policy
Alternatives. 75 The new demand created by a strict noise standard would, consequently,
seem to be a powerful stimulus to innovation in noise control technology.
With respect to the effect of regulation on industry in general, there has been a great
deal of comment asserting that the increased costs imposed by regulation will hamper innova
tion. Most of this comment is opinion or theory and runs contrary to the only empirical work
on the subject, a study recently completed at the Center for Policy Alternatives. What has
been found is that, in contrast to this conventional wisdom, environmental and safety regula
tions are a positive stimulus to commercial innovations in a significant number of cases.
The results are based on a study of 164 successful, unsuccessful, and on-going projects
in firms in five foreign countries and five industries, where data were gathered through inter
views with project managers.^ The environmental and safety regulations in evidence were
more often associated with successful than unsuccessful projects by a factor of three, with a
10 percent chance that this distinction was random. Even more significant was the fact that
projects were conducted differently because of regulation ten times more often in the case of
successful projects than was true for unsuccessful projects. These observations were highly
statistically significant, with the chance of random occurrence only 2 percent, and uniform
across countries.
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The firms and industries interviewed were not concerned with making or selling
pollution control equipment or services. They tended to be large and older, indicating that
particularly in mature highly concentrated industries regulation exerts a salutary influence
on the process of innovation. Apparently, regulation stimulates product and process change
in the firm to meet new conditions and thus provides opportunities for innovation which
otherwise might not have occurred.
It is recognized that this study has limitations both in the scope and in the number of
its observations. Nevertheless, it is felt that its findings are highly relevant to a consideration
of the benefits arising from environmental and safety regulation and they suggest that the
effect of workplace noise regulation on innovation may well be positive both within and with
out the noise control industry.
Quantification of Net Costs
Attempts have been made to quantify some important benefits. Presented in Tables
2-24 and 2-25 are partial balance sheets for compliance with a 90 dBA standard and 85 dBA
standard, respectively. Assuming some job mobility (3 jobs per worker), a capture of all
compensible hearing loss under present criteria, a 1 day per year per-worker reduction in
absenteeism as a proxy for all losses of worker effectiveness to his employer and a conserva
tive value of annoyance to the worker exposed to 90 dBA of 10 cents per hour. Also included
for comparison with monetarily quantifiables is the reduction in hearing impairment expressed
in both numbers of workers and person-years of impairment. Listed but unable to quantify,
are the possible effects on coronary heart disease.
Different assumptions will yield different numbers, but perhaps these preliminary
balance sheets provide a good starting point for serious discussion.
The accounting suggested indicates that compliance with a 90 dBA standard is likely to
yield a net benefit to society even after 10 years. Compliance with 85 dBA appears to be
achievable at a net cost after 10 years, but at a figure very much smaller than the compliance
cost estimates. Ultimately, compliance with the 85 dBA standard is a net benefit to society.
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Table 2-24
Net costs with 90 dBA standard
(assuming 3 jobs per worker)
($ billion)
After 10 years
compliance
After 40 years
complianceItems
Accruing primarily to firms:
Compliance costs (BBN) 13.5 13.5
Maximum workers' compensation
costs saved (present value)* (1.2)** (2.9)
Absenteeism reduced ($2 billion
per year, present value)* (14.0) (26.7)
Subtotal (1.7) (16.1)
Accruing primarily to workers:
Annoyance (lowest estimate)* (4.3) (8.1)
Total monetarily quantifiables (6.0) (24.2)
Accruing to workers:
Reduction in number impaired
(thousands)
25-50 dB range 448 1,025
Over 50 dB 81 208
Reduction in person-years of
impairment (millions)
25-50 dB range 2.2 11
Over 50 dB 0.4 2.3
Reduction in cardiovascular disease
*7 percent discount rate.
**Numbers in parentheses are benefits, i.e., negative costs.
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Table 2-25
Net costs with 85 dBA standard
(assuming 3 jobs per worker)
($ billion)
After 10 years
compliance
After 40 years
compliance
Items
Accruing primarily to firms:
Compliance costs (BBN) 31.6 31.6
Maximum workers' compensation
costs saved (present value)* (1.9)** (4.5)
Absenteeism reduced ($2 billion
per year, present value)* (14.0) (26.7)
Subtotal 15.7 (0.4)
Accruing primarily to workers:
Annoyance (lowest estimate)* (6.5) (12.4)
Total monetarily quantifiables 9.2 (12.8)
Accruing to workers:
Reduction in number impaired
(thousands)
25-50 dB range 767 1,760
Over 50 dB 114 286
Reduction in person-years of
impairment (millions)
25-50 dB range 3.8 19
Over 50 dB 0.5 3.2
Reduction in cardiovascular disease
*7 percent discount rate.
**Numbers in parentheses are benefits, i.e., negative costs.
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Section 3
EQUITY
In judging the social equity of the possible alternative OSHA noise regulations, it is
important to quantify not only the magnitude of the costs and benefits but the distribution
of the costs and benefits among different groups within our society. If one alternative tends
to distribute relatively more benefits to the already well-to-do at the cost of the disadvantaged,
the social drawbacks of the alternative may well be considered to weigh against it in deter
mining social policy. Figure 3-1 indicates the group of people who tend to have hearing
handicaps in the United States. These data are from the 1962 survey by the Public Health
Service. One can see from the figures that there is a strong correlation between the level
of educational attainment and the probability of hearing handicap, and that the smaller
the amount of schooling, the more likely a hearing handicap becomes. Noise is by no
means the only factor likely to be contributing to this manifestation of social inequality —
various infectious diseases and general lack of proper medical care and living conditions
undoubtedly play a major role - however, it is clear that noise-induced hearing loss tends
to fall most heavily on those in our society with very few other resources to lose.
The fact that a certain segment of society may bear a disproportionate portion of the
costs of workplace noise raises some fundamental issues about the value, we as a society,
place upon the quality of these people's work environment. Congress has recognized this
problem and has spoken unequivocally concerning it through the OSHAct. Its clear import
is that as a nation we are committed to a continual upgrading of the quality of working
life and that this improvement justifies considerable increased costs. When these costs - or
the resulting benefits - are uncertain, the legislative mandate necessitates a resolution of
doubts in favor of this aimed-for improvement.
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Section 4
REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES
The requirement that an agency consider regulatory alternatives in detail is securely
established in law. This requirement arises first from the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA) which mandates [Section 102(c) (hi)] a "detailed statement of alternatives
to the proposed action." Second, the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) guidelines
for environmental impact statements elaborate upon this point, stressing that "the analysis
should be sufficiently detailed to reveal the agency's comparative evaluation of environ
mental benefits, costs and risks of the proposed action and each reasonable alternative."'
And lastly, OSHA's own regulations^ reiterate the NEPA requirements and refer to the
CEQ guidelines.
OSHA has compiled with the formal legal requirements of the impact statement
procedure in its publications to date. The adequacy of this compliance is potentially a
subject for the courts to review under the precepts established by recent cases.3 The
comments which follow do not intend to assess the legal sufficiency of OSHA's position but
rather attempt to synthesize various points of view on alternative regulatory possibilities
and to suggest additional items for agency consideration.
INDUSTRY SPECIFIC STANDARDS
Perhaps the most-discussed regulatory alternative has been industry-specific noise
standards. There has been a consistent difference of opinion between OSHA and EPA,
and in consequence come controversy, concerning the desirability and/or legal propriety
of this option. As things now stand, EPA has given a cautious general endorsement to
this approach,^ but OSHA rejects it because of "the delay involved in developing and
enforcing such standards. "*
At the root of the controversy is the fact that different industry groups exhibit wide
variations in their general levels of noise exposure, a situation which naturally leads to
corresponding differences in the cost of complying with whatever noise standard is
promulgated. Moreover, the technological parameters of noise control vary significantly
from industry to industry. These differences have been documented by both NIOSH and
by. Bolt, Beranek and Newman.
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Accordingly, it is quite possible that industry-specific standards would be found,
after having been given full consideration, to be more protective of workers than an equally
costly uniform standard. This point has been made before in testimony at this hearing
by George Eads, Council on Wage and Price Stability and will not be dwelt upon. One
would reiterate the question, however, whether this alternative has been given the full
consideration which it merits.
The primary objection to varying noise standards according to industry groups seems
to be the administrative difficulties associated with this course of action. However, it is
worth pointing out that there is considerable precedent for this approach, both from OSHA
itself and from EPA. OSHA has, for instance, created a unique category of Occupational
Safety and Health Standards for special industries. The areas singled out include Paper
Pulp, Textiles, Bakeries, Laundries, and Pesticides. ^ Moreover, one could assert that most
safety (as opposed to health) standards are industry-specific; and these are, of course, being
promulgated and enforced successfully by OSHA. EPA also has promulgated many industry-
specific standards, notably in the water pollution area; and the viability of this regime has
already been commented upon in the hearings by EPA.
Leaving aside the matter of ease of administration, it can be urged that industry-specific
standards best further the purposes of the OSHAct. It is important to keep in mind that
under the Act, OSHA's responsibility is to promulgate a standard, adequate to ensure that
no employee suffers material impairment of health or capacity. Therefore, it seems clear
that the stricter the standard, the closer to this goal. On the other hand, it is apparent that
the goals of the OSHAct are tempered somewhat by considerations of feasibility. That
feasibility contains an economic component seems clear from both the legislative history
of the Act^ and subsequent caselaw construing this section.^ It is precisely the questions
of economic feasibility that argues most strongly for industry-by-industry standards. For
instance, since the costs of compliance (i.e., the feasibility) vary so widely among industrial
sectors, it is entirely likely that for an identical price, one industry could achieve an 80
dBA standard while another could only reach 90 dBA. Given that considerations of
feasibility are equivalent in these two situations, it seems entirely appropriate to enact
the differing noise standards which reflect this fact.
In any event, whatever the desirability of industry-specific standards, it seems legally
incumbent upon OSHA to consider them more fully than it has to date. This requirement
springs from the Industrial Union Department case, which was a contest of the asbestos
health standards promulgated by OSHA. One of the points in issue concerned the effective
date of the regulation which was to be uniform for all industries. Thus, in a situation
very analogous to that currently designated in the noise context, OSHA promulgated a
5-fiber standard for all industries which would be reduced to 2-fibers for all industries
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after 4 years. Evidence was introduced showing that many industries could have compiled
well within the allowable 4 years. NIOSH had, on the basis of this evidence, recommended
varying standards depending on industry compliance capability. Nevertheless, OSHA
promulgated a uniform standard, largely for reasons of practical administration.
The D.C. Circuit Court, while upholding the general standards, remanded for clarifica
tion or reconsideration, the part making the standard uniform. In so doing, it made several
very important points concerning industry-specific standards. First, the court chided
OSHA for not seeking more information showing inter- and intra-industry differences.
Second, it maintained that industry-specific standards "would not appear to create opportu
nities for employers in one industry to challenge their standards on the grounds that
standards for another industry were less demanding" (except if the industries were directly
competing).* Lastly, the court refused to accept OSHA's cryptic reference to reasons of
practical administration as justification for uniformity. Its specific statement on the subject
is as follows:
"It is possible that the Secretary failed to pursue this point because
he interpreted the statute to require a single uniform standard for
reasons of practical administration. If so, we disagree. The statutory
scheme is generally calculated to give the Secretary broad responsibility
for determining when standards are required and what those standards
should be. If the Secretary determines that meaningful distinctions
between the compliance capabilities of various industries can be defined,
he is authorized to structure the standards accordingly."
When one returns to the noise standard-setting context after considering the above
authority, several things seem clear. First of all, it is apparent that the discussion to date
concerning industry-specific standards has been deficient in its depth and seriousness.
OSHA's examination of this alternative has been rather cursory and its reasons for
rejection conclusory. A fuller consideration of this option is clearly required by existing
legal authority: NEPA and its implementing regulations, which unambiguously outline
the alternatives section of an impact statement; and the Industrial Union case, which held
that industry-specificity in health standards must be explored before a uniform standard
can be set.
*Although the court did not address the problem of equal protection for employees,
there would not seem to be any legal difficulty as long as there was a reasonable basis for
differing industry standards.
Second, on the basis of the OSHAct itself, past agency actions under it, and the relevant
caselaw, it appears that OSHA has perfect legal competence to promulgate regulations in the
industry-specific form. The Industrial Union case made it clear that inequity in treatment
of different industries is not a legal impediment; and administrative difficulty is similarly not
a persuasive legal argument without some data to support this assertion. Moreover, the
existence of a group of industry -specific standards currently in force attests to both the
legality and practicality of this option.
Lastly, it should be pointed out that the initial standard need not be thoroughly
industry-specific. 85 dBA or 80 dBA could still be a generally applicable standard unless
otherwise stated. OSHA could then, at its leisure, promulgate lower (or perhaps higher if
appropriate) standards for groups of industries exhibiting similar characteristics, with the
ultimate goal of refining these initial categorizations. Such a "phasing-in" of industry-
specificity would go a long way toward easing the perceived administrative burden.
COMPLIANCE SCENARIOS
Somewhat analogous to the industry-specific standards problem is that relating to the
proper compliance scenario. The BBN study postulated two different compliance schedules,
3 years and 5 years. Its projections of the costs of these two scenarios come closer to
meeting NEPA's requirements concerning the weighing of regulatory alternatives than do
any of the discussions concerning other options. OSHA, however, has proposed to make
the 90 dBA standard effective immediately, since it represents no change from the level
which has been required for the last 4 years.
Assuming the desirability of a 90 dBA limit, this position seems perfectly proper.
Although there are clearly many firms currently in noncompliance with this standard, it
seems unwise to grant them a blanket exemption for another few years when the OSHAct
already provides a number of mechanisms (e.g., variances, abatement agreements) to lengthen
the compliance period in appropriate individual cases. When one considers 85 dBA as an
option, however, the agency's analysis seems somewhat deficient. It should be emphasized
that OSHA has chosen to at least consider the 85 dBA alternative, yet in that context it has
not discussed varying compliance scenarios. (Its only mention of time is to allege that a
3-year compliance period is beyond the capability of the acoustical products industry.)
This omission seems at odds with the holding in the Industrial Union case which remanded
the asbestos standard for reconsideration on the question of different compliance schedules
for different industries. A noise standard which similarly neglects to make this kind of
analysis in the face of data which indicate so clearly wide industry differences in the costs of
compliance might well face a similar remand.
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It should also be pointed out that varying compliance scenarios can give an entirely
new complexion to the substance of the standard. For instance, assuming for purposes of
argument that 85 dBA were in fact infeasible (i.e., crippling to industry) if required within
1 year, the same level might well be eminently feasible (i.e., the costs could comfortably be
absorbed) within 3, 5 or 7 years. BBN has made exactly this assertion with respect to the
ability of the acoustic products industry to absorb the demand created by an 85 dBA
standard.
As a last point, it should be noted that varying compliance scenarios can be employed
in combination with industry-specific standards to achieve a more optimal balance between
the regulatory demands of worker protection and feasibility - technological, economic
and administrative.
NEW PLANT STANDARDS
The possibility of a different standard for newly designed or constructed workplaces
from that for existing workplaces was first explored by NIOSH in its noise criteria docu
ment. There NIOSH recommended an 85 dBA level for all newly designed installations 6
months after the effective date of the standard, even though it had endorsed 90 dBA as the
general standard. EPA now endorses the NIOSH proposal and OSHA rejects it on the
rationale that it would prove too cumbersome for purposes of inspection and enforcement.
It is worthwhile noting that the OSHA statement of this alternative considers it only
for those newly designed occupational environments for which control is currently techno
logically feasible. In view of OSHA's earlier assertion on its preliminary draft EIS that
the technology to fulfill this alternative was not available, a few remarks are in order on
this point.
First of all, BBN has asserted that with existing technology, the sound levels of 92
percent of all jobs could be reduced to 85 dBA. Even if this were not true, one could expect
the new technologies to develop quickly in response to the new demand, as has been shown
in the various studies of innovation referred to earlier.
In any case, it is now clear, legally, that a lack of technology is not a sufficient reason
to reject a regulatory alternative. On the contrary, an agency may specify a standard which
necessitates an upgrading of technologies in order for it to be met. This was a holding of
the recent case which upheld the OSHA vinyl chloride standard ' ^a. The court specifically
addressed this point, as follows:
"In the area of safety, we wish to emphasize, the Secretary is not restricted by
the status quo. He may raise standards which require improvements in existing
4-5
technologies or which require the development of new technology, and he is
not limited to issuing standards based solely on devices already fully
developed."
This point has already actually been established in other cases, ' ' but it was brought
home forcefully here in the OSHA health standard context.
Whether or not new technology is actually needed to implement an 85 dBA standard
for newly designed workplaces, it is clear that it is considerably less costly to install
whatever controls are needed before industrial plants are fully constructed than after.
Recognition of this fact, and the fact that it outweighs any associated administrative
difficulties, has been made by various other nations' strict standards for new plants and
equipment (notably Australia and Finland).
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
Personal protective equipment and administrative controls both play a part in the
workplace noise standard even though OSHA criticizes them and prefers controls developed
at the source of the noise.
Protectors are to beemployed in the following circumstances:
1. When employees receive a daily noise dose of more than 0.5 (i.e., > 85 dBA) if their audio
grams shew any significant threshold shift (i.e., > 10 dB at 2000, 3000, 4000 Hz).
2. When noise exposure is in excess of the limits allowed, in the following three cases:
a) during the implementation of controls,
b) when controls are feasible only to a limited extent, and
c) when controls are shown to be infeasible.
It is apparent that OSHA in its proposed standard desires to limit the use of personal
protective equipment as a primary method of compliance. However, upon analysis of the
proposed provisions, actual practice which may result may not be consistent with OSHA's
aforementioned criticisms of this alternative. Since equipment may be used when controls
are infeasible or only feasible to a limited extent, their allowance in this manner opens up a
potentially significant loophole in the standard. Although the use of these terms imparts
an inherent flexibility to the provisions concerning hearing protectors, confusion as to
their meaning and avoidance of the standard are other other likely results. The decision
as to whether protectors are acceptable will, under the OSHA proposal, be made, initially
by firms, on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis according to questions of feasibility. Since the
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question of feasibility has, more than other, prompted controversy with reference to
the general standard, it is doubtful whether its use in this subsidiary context is at all wise.
It should also be noted that no forum for resolving the feasibility of controls problem
is provided, and this omission will undoubtedly augment the confusion.
Another apparent contradiction in the hearing protector provisions arises from the
fact that 10 dB individual change in hearing level at 2, 3 and 4 kHz is defined as a significant
threshold shift, requiring protective equipment. While this is a laudably protective position,
it does not seem to comport with the 25 dB at .5,1+2 kHz fence which has been proposed by
OSHA in the general standard context to define material impairment, as mentioned earlier.
In sum, although there is no cause to quarrel with OSHA's general position on personal
protective equipment, it seems that the specifics of the standard require clearer definition.
First, a forum and guidelines for resolving questions of feasibility should be provided,* and
second, the apparent conflict between two varying definitions of significant threshold shift
should be reconciled.
The question of administrative controls has been discussed earlier in this presentation.
It is worth emphasizing again, however, that since they may in fact lead to a greater, not
smaller, total impairment, their inclusion in the standard needs re-examination.
VARIANCES AND ABATEMENT AGREEMENTS
Strictly speaking, variances and abatement agreements have little to do with OSHA's
standard-setting function, the former being an individual exemption to an already promul
gated standard, and the latter, an attempt to compel, albeit amicably, compliance with an
infringed standard. Nevertheless, they are relevant to setting a workplace noise standard
because they pertain to enforcement of such a standard; moreover, they are relevant to this
hearing in particular because both EPA and OSHA have commented previously upon their
usefulness. ' ^
The essence of EPA's position has been that OSHA should adopt a strict (i.e., 85 dBA)
noise level and use variances and abatement agreements as tools to mitigate any potentially
harsh effects in individual cases. OSHA in response has recognized that these exceptions
*A possible solution would be to allow protective equipment as a long-term solution
rather than engineering controls only after the controls have been deemed infeasible by
OSHA in a variance proceeding, perhaps with provision for periodic review to reassess the
feasibility in light of new technology.
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should conceivably eventually swallow up a general rule and therefore has stressed its initial
obligation to promulgate a feasible standard.
In a sense, both positions are correct. While it is true that OSHA standards should be
realistic, it is also clear that the OSHAct provides various means to work around standards
that may be overly strict for certain individuals. Variances are one such method, particularly
suitable when technological difficulties hinder compliance (it should be emphasized that
they are not allowable as a means of softening economic hardship). Abatement agreements
are a currently evolving technique which have great potential use as a flexible enforcement
tool. These after-the-fact regulatory methods should be kept in mind before the promulga
tion of any standard since they may in large part determine the actual form the standard
takes in its application.
CONCLUSIONS
Several different regulatory alternatives have been discussed herein. This group
comprises an impressive array of regulatory options open to OSHA by which it can vary
primarily the form, but in consequence, the substance as well, of its eventual workplace
noise standard. Several basic questions have been raised in this discussion concerning
OSHA's consideration to date of these alternatives.
First, one must ask whether each alternative has been given the kind of full consideration
it deserves-indeed the kind the law requires. The answer in some of the cases must be
negative, since much of the discussion in OSHA's EIS has been short and conclusory, not
the detailed analysis required under NEPA. Moreover, some— notably the industry-by-
industry standards option -have not measured up to the courts' requirements that a
promulgated standard be supported by a full and complete record. Consequently, it seems
plausible that as things now stand the proposed OSHA standard and its supporting EIS
could well be overturned in a judicial contest for not fulfilling these procedural requirements.
Second, one must ask whether OSHA's reasons for rejecting these alternatives were
correct, either as a legal or as a policy matter. The answer to this question again necessitates
a considerably fuller record.
Lastly, one must ask what the existence of these regulatory alternatives as to form
(and the multitude of combinations which are possible) say about the substance of the
workplace noise standard. Initially, one is impressed with the extraordinary flexibility given
to OSHA by the OSHAct itself and the gloss the agency and the courts have put upon it.
Not only is OSHA's power legislative in nature, allowing it legally to promulgate a variety
of types of standards, but also the enforcement procedures given to the agency endow it
with a leeway exceptional among regulatory patterns. This fact attests to OSHA's ability
to mitigate inequities or harsh effects present in whatever standard it might promulgate
and to organize a viable and innovative regulatory regime. This leeway, in turn, seems to
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argue very strongly for a strict protective standard to fulfill the basic mandate of the OSHAct,
tempered by agency action to forestall cases of hardship -whether these cases be entire
industries, groups of firms, or individual corporations.
It seems appropriate, therefore, for OSHA to reconsider the regulatory options at its
disposal. This may be a necessary legal duty in any case, but it is particularly desirable now
when the entire standard is being re-examined. It should be remembered that a standard
promulgated in an agreeable form may be entirely acceptable to all parties even though its
substance might have been unpalatable in another. Accordingly, an innovative approach to
regulatory form may act as a reconciling force in the present controversy.
It is hoped that this report has been helpful in clarifying the technical, economic and
philosophical issues in the current controversy over workplace noise standards. It is
believed that the evidence warrants a serious re-examination of currently proposed
regulations.
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